Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. alliance system in Asia

International Security

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 158-196

  Cha, Victor D ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77449155861     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.158     Document Type: Article

References (218)

1. See Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945:Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 227-262
2. Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 301-338
3. G. John Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 533-550
4. Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
5. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999)
6. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41
7. Steve Weber, Multilateralism in NATO: Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power, 1945-1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)
8. G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 44-60
9. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," National Interest, No. 70 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 5-17.
10. See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009)
11. G. John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008), pp. 23-37.
12. See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 71-87
13. Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik, "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism," International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 1-31.
14. Ralph Braibanti, "The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1957), pp. 327-328.
15. John S. Duffield, "Why Is There No APTO? Why Is There No OSCAP?" Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 2 (August 2001), p. 70.
16. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 26.
17. Gerrit W. Gong, ed., Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001)
18. Nicholas Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49.
19. Memorandum by the Regional Planning Advisor (Ogburn), Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison), January 21, 1953, Secret, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, Vol. 6: East Asia and the Pacific, pt. 1, pp. 260-262.
20. As Bruce Cumings wrote, "The idea of little yellow and brown people sharing a multilateral table as equals with ivy league-educated east coast intellectuals was beyond comprehension"
21. See Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 93.
22. MacArthur testified in 1951 that his rule of thumb was to treat the Japanese as twelve-year-olds
23. See John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 303.
24. See also David Capie, "Power, Identity, and Multilateralism: The United States and Regional Institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific," Toronto University, May 2002
25. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?" International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 588.
26. See also Capie, "Power, Identity, and Multilateralism," p. 68.
27. Javed Maswood, "The Rise of the Asia-Pacific," in Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook, eds., Asia-Pacific in the New World Order (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 57.
28. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 13-14.
29. Miles Kahler, "Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific," in Andrew Mack and Mark Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), pp. 16-39
30. Peter Katzenstein, "Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," Cooperation and Coflict, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 123-159.
31. John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 105
32. Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993), pp. 501-525.
33. Hemmer and Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?" p. 588.
34. Paul Schroeder first used this term in 1976 to describe how Western alliances serve as tools of management in addition to deterrence
35. See Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945," p. 230.
36. I thank Michael Brown for the term "rogue allies."
37. Minutes of Discussion, President Eisenhower and President Rhee, July 27, 1954, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, pt. 2, pp. 1839-1847.
38. Quoted in Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953-1960 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001), p. 177.
39. For example, NSC 48/5 stated that in addition to containment, the United States must "avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union, and seek to avoid the extension beyond Korea of hostilities with communist China." NSC 48/5, United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia, Top Secret, May 17, 1951 in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: East Asia and the Pacific, pt. 1, p. 49.
40. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945," p. 242.
41. The work on alliances as instruments of control is undertheorized. For initial efforts, see ibid.
42. George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 116
43. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 22, 28
44. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 70-71
45. Patricia Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004)
46. Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).
47. Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?"
48. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently," Policy Review, No. 113 (June/July 2002), pp. 3-28
49. Nye, The Paradox of American Power
50. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Realism, Structural Liberalism, and theWestern Order," in Kapstein and Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics, pp. 103-137
51. John Van Oudenaren, "Unipolar versus Unilateral: Confusing Power with Purpose," Policy Review, No. 124 (April/May 2004), http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3438956.html
52. Charles Krauthammer, "The Bush Doctrine," Weekly Standard, June 4, 2001, pp. 21-25
53. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001)
54. Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002)
55. Lisa L. Martin, "The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 91-122
56. Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," National Interest, No. 71 (Spring 2003), pp. 29-40
57. Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism 3.0."
58. G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78
59. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999).
60. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," p. 331
61. Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" p. 535
62. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
63. Weber, Multilateralism in NATO
64. Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter?"
65. Kahler, "Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific"
66. Davis Bobrow, "Hegemony Management: The U.S. in the Asia-Pacific," Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 173-197.
67. Kagan, "Power and Weakness," pp. 3-28.
68. Kent E. Calder, Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia (New York: Morrow, 1996), p. 194.
69. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945," pp. 233, 236-237, 241.
70. Robert Jervis, "Explaining the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 365-388
71. Michael J. Green, "The Iraq War and Asia: Assessing the Legacy," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 181-200.
72. A great power may exercise its control for several purposes. First, it may want to control the domestic policies of its partners, as Metternich did during the 1820s and 1830s through the German Confederation. Second, it may want to limit the smaller power's independent action that it might consider inimical to its interests. Germany's Dual Alliance of 1879 with Austria-Hungary provided security against the Russian threat. Although Germany bore an inordinate share of the costs of the alliance, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck believed that the value added of the alliance was the ability to slow the growth of Slavic federalism and prevent the junior partner from practicing independent policies.
73. See Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945," p. 243.
74. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, 1938), p. 7.
75. Extracts of Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, with General MacArthur in Tokyo, August 6 and 8, 1950, Top Secret, August 20, 1950 in FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7: Korea, p. 544.
76. Paper prepared by John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, Secret, November 30, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6: East Asia and the Pacific, pp. 162-163.
77. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Deputy Undersecretary of State (Matthews), Top Secret, January 31, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: Asia and the Pacific, pt. 1, p. 20.
78. See, for example, National Intelligence Estimate-20, Secret, March 20, 1951, in ibid., pp. 27-31.
79. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).
80. See also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York: Twayne, 1994), p. 24
81. A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1977), p. 176
82. Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 7.
83. Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, pp. 19, 68
84. Clough, Island China, p. 10.
85. Telegram, Charge in Republic of China (Jones) to the Department of State, Top Secret, July 22, 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14: China and Japan, pp. 76-77
86. Telegram, Charge in the Republic of China (Jones) to the Department of State, Secret, May 27, 1953, in ibid., p. 197.
87. Memorandum of Conversation, Leonard Price of the Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Top Secret, February 20, in ibid., p. 13.
88. Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green), September 18, 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19: China, p. 222.
89. Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, pp. 22, 32.
90. Memorandum of Conversation, Leonard Price of the Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Top Secret, February 20, 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14: China and Japan, p. 13
91. Barnett, China and the Majors Powers in East Asia, p. 376 n. 68.
92. "United States Policy toward Formosa," Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1950, p. 5.
93. Eisenhower's entrapment fears were more pronounced than those of Truman, because he did not want to see a renewal of hostilities in Asia after the Korean armistice was achieved. Truman, on the other hand, disliked Chiang's provocations but also considered the use of Formosan aggression to open a front on the mainland.
94. See NIE-10, "Communist China," Secret, January 17, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 7: Korea and China, p. 1513.
95. NSC directives that same year considered similar options. See Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, January 17, 1951, in ibid., p. 1517.
96. Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003).
97. Memorandum by Green, p. 223.
98. The key portion of the note read: "In view of the obligations of the two Parties Under the said Treaty and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to actions of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense." United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 6, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 454.
99. Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), November 16, 1954, Top Secret, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14: China and Japan, p. 901.
100. Ibid., p. 921.
101. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, November 23, 1954, Secret, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14: China and Japan, p. 929.
102. For Eisenhower's and Dulles's remarks, see Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, March 31, 1953, in ibid., p. 170
103. 139th meeting of the National Security Council, April 8, 1953, in ibid., p. 181.
104. Memorandum of Discussion at the 139th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, D.C., April 8, 1953, Top Secret, in ibid., pp. 181-182
105. Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Chief of General Staff, Republic of China (Chow), Top Secret, February 5, 1953, in ibid., pp. 193,144-145.
106. Talking paper prepared by Secretary of State Dulles, October 21, 1958, Secret, Personal and Private, Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Box 127, Chiang Kai-shek, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19: China, pp. 413-417.
107. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Top Secret, September 25, 1958, in ibid., p. 274.
108. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, October 13,1958, in ibid., pp. 381-382
109. Letter, Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-shek, May 17, 1956, in FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 3: China, p. 361.
110. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Office Files, 1953-1961, pt. 2, International Series: Formosa, 1952-57 (1) "The Taiwan Straits Situation, 1 September 1958," appendix, sec. 4d, 6b.
111. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, Top Secret, September 6, 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19: China, p. 143.
112. Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 4.
113. Robert Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea: 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun, 1978), p. 48.
114. President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman, Restricted, July 19, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7: Korea, pp. 429-430.
115. Syngman Rhee through Western Eyes (Seoul: Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea, 1954), p. 2.
116. State Department, 895.00 File, Box 946, Muccio to Butterworth, November 1, 1949: Truman Library, Muccio Oral History Interview, No. 177, December 27, 1973
117. quoted in Bruce Cumings, "The Structural Basis of 'Anti-Americanism' in the Republic of Korea," paper presented at the "Conference on Korean Attitudes toward the United States," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., January 30, 2003, n. 33.
118. Quoted in Chang Jin Park, "The Influence of Small States upon the Superpowers," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1 (October 1975), p. 97.
119. Quoted in Kim, Master of Manipulation, p. 177.
120. Quoted in ibid., pp. 175-176.
121. Plan EVERREADY was devised in 1952 and called for the arrest of Rhee and the declaration of martial law in the name of the United Nations. See ibid., pp. 90-91.
122. Quoted in ibid., p. 141.
123. Cumings, "The Structural Basis of 'Anti-Americanism' in the Republic of Korea," n. 33.
124. Quoted in Kim, Master of Manipulation, p. 181.
125. Meeting of the Military Subcommittee, July 28, 1954, Folder: Minutes of Meetings, July 1954, United States and Republic of Korea, Box 11, Correspondence File, 1953-54, Far East Command, quoted in ibid., p. 179.
126. Dulles told Nixon, "[I]t is necessary to get some explicit written assurance from Rhee that he is not going to start the war up again on the gamble that he can get us involved in his effort to unite Korea by force." Letter, Secretary of State to the Vice President, Top Secret, November 4, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, p. 1590.
127. Letter, President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee), Top Secret, November 4, 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, p. 1592.
128. I believe this is the first treatment of U.S. contingency plans against the South Korean government based on evidence in the Eisenhower administration's archives.
129. In 1961 this understanding was delimited to UN control over ROK forces only vis-à-vis an external communist invasion
130. NSC 170/1, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," November 20, 1953, Top Secret, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, p. 1621.
131. The provision regarding covert support of Rhee's overthrow was first contained in a presidentially approved revision of a 1953 NSC policy document on Korea (NSC 170/1 Annex A). See ibid., pp. 1620-1624. The revision stated: "D. To select and encourage covertly the development of new South Korean leadership prepared to cooperate in maintaining the armistice, and if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action, assist such new leadership to assume power, by means not involving overt U.S. participation until and unless U.S. overt support is necessary and promises to be decisive in firmly establishing such new leadership." This provision was circulated only to the secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and director of central intelligence. Subsequent NSC policy reviews on Korea made reference to the annex (later known as Annex F), but the actual contents were kept separate. The provision about U.S. unilateral abrogation of the treaty came about a couple of years later in a revision of NSC 5817 (revised as NSC 5907).
132. Memorandum of Discussion at the 411th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1959, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, p. 569.
133. On the EDF proposal in 1950, see James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 186-187.
134. Telegram, Charge in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, March 22, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7: The Far East and Australasia
135. Telegram, Charge in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, March 24, 1949, in ibid., pt. 2, pp. 1125-1127
136. Memorandum of Conversation, Director of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), with Dr. John M. Chang, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, Secret, April 8, 1949, in ibid.
137. Memorandum of Conversation, Counselor of the Embassy in Korea (Drumright), Confidential, May 28, 1949, in ibid., pp. 1141-1142, 1145-1146.
138. Telegram, Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, July 12, 1949, in ibid., pp. 1152-1153
139. Telegram, Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, Priority, August 8, 1949, in ibid., p. 1184.
140. U.S. intelligence assessments judged that China could not capitalize on Taiwan's military position if these proffered forces were diverted to Korea. Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) and Chinese Ambassador (Koo), Confidential, July 3, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. 2: Korea, pp. 285-286.
141. John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 47-48.
142. Press Release by the Secretary of State, May 18, 1949, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (May 29, 1949), p. 696.
143. Telegram, Secretary of State (Acheson) to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, Secret, July 20, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7: The Far East and Australasia, pt. 2 (1976), p. 1170.
144. David W. Mabon, "Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals of 1949-1951," Pacific-Historical Review, Vol. 57, No. 2 (May 1988), pp. 147-178, at p. 151.
145. Telegram, Secretary of State (Acheson) to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, p. 1170. Acheson angrily cabled the U.S. embassy in Seoul about Chiang's motives: "[It is] inescapably evident to all concerned that Natlist Chi, far from being positive force in FE [Far East], constitutes polit and mil liability which would foredoom [Pacific] Union to failure.. .. Secy has given definitive answer on question US support Pacific Pact from which position U.S. not likely to be moved by maneuvers which appear designed extract mil commitments." Telegram, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, Top Secret, July 29, 1949, in ibid., p. 1177.
146. Telegram, Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, Priority, August 3, 1949, in ibid., pp. 1181-1182.
147. Telegram, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, Top Secret, July 29, 1949, in ibid., pp. 1177-1178.
148. Charles M. Dobbs, "The Pact That Never Was: The Pacific Pact of 1949," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 29-42, at p. 34.
149. Extracts of Memorandum of Conversations, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President with General MacArthur, Tokyo, August 6 and 8, 1950, Top Secret, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6: East Asia and the Pacific, pp. 427-430.
150. Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to John Foster Dulles, Secret, December 24, 1952, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14: China and Japan, p. 119.
151. Romulo's plan called for the creation of a wider Southeast and South Asia union that would have included Australia, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. Romulo's proposal reproduced in Memorandum by the Policy Information Office of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Fisher) to the Director of the Office (Butterworth), Secret, July 15, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7: The Far East and Australasia, p. 1164.
152. Ibid., p. 1162.
153. Acheson asked the embassy to tell Romulo that the United States "shall be glad discuss with Romulo upon his return to Washington appropriate means by which US might make clear its appreciation of value of a regional approach without creating misunderstanding of the sort indicated. As Romulo... aware problem complicated by confusion in most quarters resulting from divergent concepts of Association now under discussion." Telegram, Secretary of State to the Embassy of the Philippines, Secret, August 23, 1949, in ibid., pp. 1190-1191.
154. Memorandum of Conversation [Truman] [Quirino], Secret, February 4, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6: East Asia and the Pacific, p. 1413.
155. Telegram, Charge in the Philippines to the Secretary of State, Confidential, August 4, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7: The Far East and Australasia, pp. 1182-1183
156. Telegram, Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, NIACT, August 4, 1949, in ibid., p. 1183.
157. Yasuyo Sakata, "The Western Pacific Collective Security Concept," Gunsa [Military history] (Seoul: Institute for Military History Compilation, December 2005), pp. 84-86.
158. This was known as the Pacific Ocean pact and is the subject of a later section
159. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 41.
160. See Conversation between General of the Army MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. George F. Kennan, March 21, 1948 (amended March 23, 1948), Top Secret, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p. 712.
161. The Chinese foreign minister, Wang Shih-chieh, conveyed this view to Dulles in September 1948. See Memorandum by John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, Secret, October 1, 1948, in ibid., p. 856.
162. See Conversation between General MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. George F. Kennan, pp. 712-713.
163. See Kennan's consultations with Canadian ambassador, Memorandum of a Conversation with Mr. George F. Kennan, Chief of the Division of Planning and Policy in the U.S. State Department, attended by Mr. R. Atherton et al., June 1, 1948, Ottawa, Secret, June 3, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p. 806.
164. "Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan," NSC 13/2, October 7, 1948, Top Secret, in ibid., pp. 877-878.
165. See Conversation between General of the Army MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. George F. Kennan, p. 713
166. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), Top Secret, April 9, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p. 728.
167. "Outline of Far Eastern and Asian Policy for Review with the President," Secret, November 14, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7: The Far East and Australasia, pt. 2, p. 1213.
168. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 108-109.
169. John Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1952), p. 175.
170. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 305-306.
171. Quoted in John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (London: Athlone, 1988), p. 88.
172. Dulles once confided to British officials that the 1951 treaty was a voluntary continuation of the military occupation, but in the guise of a normal political relationship between two nationstates
173. See LaFeber, The Clash, p. 316.
174. Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," p. 182.
175. Memorandum, Notes on Conversation among Ambassador Dulles, Australian and New Zealand Ministers for External Affairs, and Staffs, Secret, February 16, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: Asia and the Pacific, pt. 1, p. 160.
176. Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Secret, August 21, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7: Korea, pp. 623-628, especially p. 625. Kennan quoted author Tyler Dennett's rendering of Roosevelt's policy to Korea in 1905, agreeing that Japan's control of Korea was preferable to "Korean mis-management, Chinese interference, or Russian bureaucracy." Ibid.
177. Department of State to the Australian Embassy, Aide-Memoire, June 12, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, p. 813.
178. Tim Weiner, "CIA Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's," New York Times, October 9, 1994
179. The "Dooman" operation entailed smuggling tons of tungsten from Japanese military supplies to the Pentagon for $10 million between 1950 and 1953. The CIA provided $2.8 million for the financing of the operations.
180. See also Chalmers Johnson, "The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction," JPRI Working Paper, No. 11 (San Francisco, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute (JPRI), University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, July 1995), http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp11.html
181. LaFeber, The Clash, p. 318
182. Michael Schaller, "America's Favorite War Criminal: Kishi Nobosuke and the Transformation of U.S.-Japan Relations," JPRI Working Paper, No. 11 (San Francisco, Calif.: JPRI, July 1995), http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp11.html.
183. The concerns about a Sino-Japanese rapprochement were shared by a pro-Taiwan group of fifty-six U.S. senators, led by William Knowland (R-Calif.), who opposed a Japan peace treaty with communist China and issued a threat to Dulles that they would not ratify the U.S.-Japan bilateral defense treaty.
184. LaFeber, The Clash, p. 293.
185. Ibid., p. 305. Eisenhower ultimately chose a middle path, allowing the private trade with China of some goods, including even those on the restricted CHINCOM lists, in an effort to reduce any pique that might endear the Japanese to initiatives being made by Khrushchev.
186. Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 54.
187. Carter Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, Korea Old and New: A History (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990), p. 396.
188. Eisenhower wrote to Rhee, "To turn now to economic matters,... if I believed that those [economic assistance] funds would merely create new targets in a war renewed by you, I could not, consistently with my duty, request Congress to authorize this appropriation." Letter, President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee), Top Secret, November 4, 1953, in FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, p. 1592. Rhee's response is quoted in Kim, Master of Manipulation, p. 145.
189. Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 36.
190. In January 1951 Dulles was appointed by Truman as a special assistant to consider potential defense arrangements for the Pacific. "Draft of a Possible Pacific Ocean Pact," Secret, January 3, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: Asia and the Pacific, p. 133
191. E.D.L. Killen, "The Anzus Pact and Pacific Security," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 21, No. 14 (October 1952), p. 138.
192. Memorandum by John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary, to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), Secret, January 4, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: Asia and the Pacific, pt. 1, pp. 134-135.
193. "Minutes Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, February 5, 9:30 AM," in Memorandum by Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, February 5, 1951, Secret, in ibid., p. 858.
194. Memorandum by Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Secret, February 16, 1951, in ibid., p. 157.
195. Personal Letter, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary, to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (MacArthur), Confidential, March 18, 1951, in ibid., p. 931.
196. Nishimura's memoirs, published as Anzen Hosho Joyaku Ron (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1960), are quoted in Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 51. There is no mention of Yoshida's boycott in State Department cables.
197. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Special Assistant to the Consultant (Allison), Secret, January 12, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: East Asia and the Pacific, pp. 139-140
198. Telegram, United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, Secret, February 2, 1951, in ibid., pp. 143-145. The United States opposed any European power inclusion in the pact.
199. See Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Top Secret, April 11, 1951, in ibid., pp. 192-201.
200. Memorandum of Conversation among Ambassador Dulles, Ministers for External Affairs of Australia and New Zealand, February 17, 1951, in ibid., p. 171.
201. Ibid., pp. 164, 170
202. Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969), p. 90.
203. Mabon, "Elusive Agreements," p. 164.
204. Draft Memorandum for the President Attachment, Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense (Marshall), Secret, April 5, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6: Asia and the Pacific, pp. 183-185.
205. See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-139
206. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-592
207. Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, "Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 203-227
208. Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 801-827.
209. Stephen R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256.
210. For example, if patron Amakes commitments to B such that B knows that patron Ais "locked in" (i.e., unconditionally obligated to intervene on B's behalf), then control may fail because bargaining leverage effectively shifts to B.
211. For distancing, see Randall L. Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73-103.
212. See also Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495
213. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
214. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168
215. Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 261-291.
216. Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy, No. 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 161-182
217. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 326-328.