Information feedback in a dynamic tournament

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 242-260

  Aoyagi, Masaki ^a  

^a OSAKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Information revelation; Interim performance evaluation; Jensen's inequality; Mechanism; Tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 77349125799     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.013     Document Type: Article

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