On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 201-221

  Angeles De Frutos, Maria ^a   Rosenthal, Robert W ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009997478     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0628     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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