Decision science: From Ramsey to dual process theories

Synthese

Volumn 172, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 129-143

  Sahlin, Nils Eric ^a   Wallin, Annika ^b   Persson, Johannes ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study ^*  (Sweden)

Author keywords

Decision science; Decision theory; Decision making; Dual process theory; Economic man; Expected utility; Human reasoning; Normative man; Prospect theory; Ramsey; Rational angel; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 77349102504     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9472-5     Document Type: Article

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