A model of delegated project choice

Econometrica

Volumn 78, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 213-244

  Armstrong, Mark ^a   Vickers, John ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b ALL SOULS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Delegation; Merger policy; Principal agent; Rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 76549106279     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA7965     Document Type: Article

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