The economics of politically-connected firms

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 605-620

  Choi, Jay Pil ^a   Thum, Marcel ^b  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DRESDEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Clientelism; Political stability; Politically connected firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 76349099609     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: 15736970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-008-9083-y     Document Type: Article

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