Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions - How (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 634-645

  Lange, Andreas ^a   Ratan, Anmol ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Field data; Induced value; Laboratory experiments; Loss aversion; Reference dependence; Revenue equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 75349109906     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.008     Document Type: Article

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