The political economy of prosecution

Annual Review of Law and Social Science

Volumn 5, Issue , 2009, Pages 135-156

  Gordon, Sanford C ^a   Huber, Gregory A ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Accountability; Asymmetric information; Criminal justice; Delegation

Indexed keywords

EID: 73949104470     PISSN: 15503585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131458     Document Type: Article

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