Directing retribution: On the political control of lower court judges

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 386-420

  Huber, Gregory A ^a   Gordon, Sanford C ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648972197     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm027     Document Type: Article

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