Political parties, political integrity and public policy: A 'transactions costs' approach

Political Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 70-88

  Jones, Philip ^a   Hudson, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BATH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035285248     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00303     Document Type: Article

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