A model of the origins of basic property rights

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 288-312

  Muthoo, Abhinay ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Incentive compatible agreements; Inter player transfers of output; Natural equilibrium; Property rights; Self enforcement; State of nature

Indexed keywords

EID: 7244257619     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.008     Document Type: Article

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