Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 407-433

  Lyne, Mona M ^a   Nielson, Daniel L ^b   Tierney, Michael J ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI KANSAS CITY   (United States)

^b BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c The College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Foreign aid; Multilateral development banks; Principal agent theory; Social lending; World Bank

Indexed keywords

EID: 71549161787     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-009-9069-2     Document Type: Article

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