Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5814 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 109-121

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Feldman, Michal ^b   Nisan, Noam ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FREE-RIDING; MAXIMAL FAMILY; PRODUCTION DESIGNS; RETURNS TO SCALE;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 71549139753     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_11     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

1. Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., Nisan, N.: Combinatorial Agency. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2006), pp. 18-28 (2006)
2. Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., Nisan, N.: Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency. In: Spirakis, P.G., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S.C. (eds.) WINE 2006. LNCS, vol. 4286, pp. 353-364. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
3. Che, Y.K., Yoo, S.W.: Optimal Incentives in Teams. American Economic Review 91, 525-541 (2001)
4. Chen, N., Karlin, A.R.: Cheap labor can be expensive. In: ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2007), pp. 707-715 (2007)
5. Cole, R., Dodis, Y., Roughgarten, T.: Pricing Networks with Selfish Routing. In: Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (2003)
6. Eidenbenz, R., Schmid, S.: Combinatorial agency with audits. In: IEEE International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets (2009)
7. Elkind, E.: The Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard to Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2005)
8. Holmstrom, B.: Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340 (1982)
9. Itoh, H.: Incentives to Help Multi-Agent Situations. Econometrica 59, 611-636 (1991)
10. Malone, T.W., Smith, S.A.: Modeling the Performance of Organizational Structures. Operations Research 36, 421-436 (1988)
11. Mass-Colell, A., Whinston, M., Green, J.: Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1995)
12. Rotemberg, J.J.: Process- Versus Function-Based Hierarchies. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8, 453-487 (1999)
13. Strausz, R.: Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams. Departmental Working Paper. Free University of Berlin (1996)
14. Winter, E.: Collocation and Incentives: Function vs. Process-Based Teams. In: Working Papaer (2005)