Sequential versus simultaneous auctions: A case study

ACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 82-91

  Fatima, Shaheen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Game theory; Multi object auctions

Indexed keywords

BIDDING STRATEGY; ENGLISH AUCTION; EXPECTED PROFITS; MULTIOBJECT; MULTIPLE OBJECTS; SEQUENTIAL MECHANISM; UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; PROFITABILITY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 70450200584     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1151454.1151479     Document Type: Conference Paper

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