Political groups, leader change, and the pattern of international cooperation

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 53, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 853-877

  Smith, Alastair ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Domestic political institutions; Infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma; Leadership; Political groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 70450191923     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002709344419     Document Type: Article

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