Collective action clauses in international sovereign bond contracts - Whence the opposition?

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 23, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 882-923

  Häseler, Sönke ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Collective action clauses; Fiscal agents; Moral hazard; Sovereign debt restructuring; Sovereign default; Trustees

Indexed keywords

ACCURACY ASSESSMENT; CAPITAL FLOW; COLLECTIVE ACTION; DEBT CRISIS; FINANCIAL MARKET; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; SOVEREIGNTY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EURASIA; EUROPE; GERMANY;

EID: 70449989784     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: 14676419     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00606.x     Document Type: Article

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