Sovereign debt restructuring: The judge, the vultures and creditor rights

World Economy

Volumn 30, Issue 10, 2007, Pages 1491-1509

  Miller, Marcus ^a   Thomas, Dania ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b KEELE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; DEBT; IMF; SOVEREIGNTY;

EID: 34548793456     PISSN: 03785920     EISSN: 14679701     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01059.x     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Aggarwal, V. K. (1998a), 'Exorcising Asian Debt: Lessons from Latin American Rollovers, Workouts, and Write-downs', Paper presented at a Conference on 'The Aftermath of the Asian Crisis' (Washington DC, 13-14 May).
2. Aggarwal, V. K. (1998b), 'Debt Rescheduling in Comparative Perspective', Paper prepared for presentation at a World Conference on 'Capital Flows in Crisis' (Washington DC, 27-28 October).
3. Broner, F., A. Martin and J. Ventura (2006), 'Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets', NBER Working Paper No. 12783.
4. Buchheit, L. C. (1995), 'The Sovereign Client', Journal of International Affairs, 48 (Winter), 527.
5. Buchheit, L. C. (1998a), 'Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause', International Financial Law Review, 17, 7, 17.
6. Buchheit, L. C. (1998b), 'The Collective Representation Clause', International Financial Law Review, 17, 9, 9.
7. Buchheit, L. C. (1999), 'A Lawyer's Perspective on the New International Financial Architecture', Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 14, 7, 225.
8. Buchheit, L. C. (2005), 'The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts', Chicago Journal of International Law, 6, 1, 333.
9. Buchheit, L. C. and M. Gulati (2000), 'Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges', UCLA Law Review, 48, 13 & 83, 59.
10. Buchheit, L. C. and M. Gulati (2002), 'Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will', Emory Law Journal, 51, 4, 1317.
11. Buchheit, L. C. and J. S. Pam (2004), 'Uruguay's Innovations', Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 19, 1, 28.
12. Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff (1989), 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt', Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1, 155-78.
13. Cohen, D. and R. Portes (2004), 'Towards a Lender of First Resort', CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4615.
14. Cordella, T. and E. Levy-Yeyati (2005), 'A (New) Country Insurance Facility', IMF Working Paper No. 23.
15. Dhillon, A., J. Garcia-Fronti, S. Ghosal and M. Miller (2006), 'Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery: Analysing the Argentine Swap', The World Economy, 29, 4, 377-98.
16. Dooley, M. (2000), 'Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?', NBER Working Paper No. 7531.
17. Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981), 'Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis', Review of Economic Studies, 48, 2, 289-309.
18. Eichengreen, B. and R. Portes (1995), Crisis, What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors (London: CEPR).
19. Esteves, R. P. (2005), 'Quis custodiet quem? Sovereign Debt and Bondholders' Protection before 1914' (Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley).
20. Fisch, J. E. and C. Gentile (2004), 'Vultures or Vanguards? The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring', Emory Law Journal, 53 (Special Edition), No. 1043.
21. Gai, P., S. Hayes and H. S. Shin (2004), 'Crisis Costs and Debtor Discipline: The Efficacy of Public Policy in Sovereign Debt Crises', Journal of International Economics, 62, 2, 245-62.
22. Gelpern, A. (2005), 'After Argentina: Policy Briefs in International Economics' (available on the website of the Institute for International Economics).
23. Gelpern, A. and G. M. Gulati (2007), 'Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study', Washington University Law Quarterly, forthcoming. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=932942.
24. Ghosal, S. and M. Miller (2002), 'Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard, and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures', Economic Journal, 113, 487, 276-304.
25. Ghosal, S. and M. Miller (2006), 'Bargaining with Delay: Growth and Sustainability' (Mimeo, University of Warwick).
26. Helleiner, E. (2006), 'The Long and Winding Road towards a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism' (Mimeo, University of Waterloo, Canada).
27. IIF (2005), Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets (Washington DC: Institute for International Finance, March).
28. IIF (2006), Principles for the Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets: Report on Implementation by the Principles Consultative Group (Washington DC: Institute for International Finance, September).
29. Inter-American Development Bank (2006), Living with Debt (Washington DC).
30. Irwin, G., A. Penalver, C. Salmon and A. Taylor (2005), 'Dealing with Country Diversity: Challenges for the IMF Coinsurance Model' (LACEA Conference, Paris).
31. Jeanne, O. and R. Ranciere (2005), 'The Optimal Level of International Reserves for Emerging Market Countries: Formulas and Applications' (Mimeo, IMF).
32. Kaletsky, A. (1985), The Costs of Default (New York: Priority Press).
33. Kletzer, K. M. and B. Wright (2000), 'Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter', American Economic Review, 90, 3, 621-39.
34. Kohlscheen, E. and S. A. O'Connell (2003), 'A Recontracting Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit' (Mimeo, IIES, Stockholm).
35. Krueger, A. (2002), A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Washington DC: IMF).
36. Levy-Yeyati, E. and U. Panizza (2005), 'The Elusive Costs of Default' (Mimeo, IADB).
37. Liascovich, C. (2005), Lavagna: La biografía (Buenos Aires: Planeta).
38. Mauro, P. and Y. Yafeh (2003), 'The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders', IMF Working Paper No. 107.
39. Merlo, A. and C. Wilson (1997) 'Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining;', Economic Theory, 11, 1, 39-55.
40. Porzecanski, A. C. (2005), 'From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina's Default', Chicago Journal of International Law, 6, 1, 311-32.
41. Rochet, J. (2005), 'Optimal Sovereign Debt: An Analytical Approach' (Mimeo, University of Toulouse).
42. Roubini, N. and B. Setser (2004), 'The Reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process: Problems, Proposed Solutions, and the Argentine Episode', Journal of Restructuring Finance, 1, 1, 1-12.
43. Sgard, J. (2004), 'IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialisation and Multilateralism', Document de Travail du CEPII No. 2004-21.
44. Stiglitz, J. (2006), Making Globalisation Work (London: Penguin Books).
45. Sturzenegger, F. and J. Zettelmeyer (2005a), 'Has the Legal Threat to Sovereign Debt Restructuring Become Real?' (http://www.utdt.edu/ ~fsturzen/legal.pdf).
46. Sturzenegger, F. and J. Zettelmeyer (2005b), 'Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005', IMF Working Paper No. 137.
47. Sturzenegger, F. and J. Zettelmeyer (2005c), 'Argentina's Restructuring: Some Facts and Some Questions', LACEA 10th Annual Meeting (Paris).
48. Sussman, O. and A. Guembel (2006), 'Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties' (Mimeo, Said Business School, University of Oxford).
49. Taylor, J. (2002), 'Using Clauses to Reform the Process for Sovereign Debt Workouts: Progress and Next Steps - Prepared Remarks at the EMTA Annual Meeting John B. Taylor Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs December 5' (http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ po3672.htm).
50. Whitford, W. C. (2003), 'A Comparison of British and American Attitudes towards the Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Contract Law', in D. Campbell, H. Collins and J. Wightman (eds.), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts (Oxford: Hart Publishing).