Strategic Judicial Decision-making

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Spiller, Pablo T ^a   Gely, Rafael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

Attitudinal approach; Internal strategic approach; Judges; Judicial decision making; Politics; Richard Posner; Strategic approach; Supreme court; United States

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449720372     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0003     Document Type: Chapter

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