Does the IMF Help or Hurt? The Effect of IMF Programs on the Likelihood and Outcome of Currency Crises

World Development

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-18

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b,c   Walter, Stefanie ^d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^c IZA and CESifo ^*  (Germany)

^d HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

compliance; conditionality; growth; IMF programs; world

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; CURRENCY; EXCHANGE RATE; FINANCIAL CRISIS; IMF;

EID: 70449658962     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.05.007     Document Type: Article

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