Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 95-115

  Ioannidou, Vasso P ^a   Penas, María Fabiana ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449623232     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2009.01.002     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Alston L., Grove A., and Wheelock D. Why do banks fail? Evidence from the 1920s. Explorations Econ. Hist. 31 (1994) 409-431
2. Besanko D., and Thakor A. Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets. Int. Econ. Rev. 28 (1987) 671-689
3. Besanko D., and Thakor A. Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information. J. Econ. Theory 71 (1987) 291-299
4. Bester H. Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information. Amer. Econ. Rev. 75 (1985) 850-855
5. Boot A., and Thakor A. Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game. Int. Econ. Rev. 35 (1994) 899-920
6. Boot A., Thakor A., and Udell G. Secured lending and default risk: equilibrium analysis and policy implications and empirical results. Econ. J. 101 (1991) 458-472
7. Broecker T. Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition. Econometrica 58 (1990) 429-452
8. Campion A. Client information sharing in Bolivia. J. Microfinance 3 (2001) 45-64
9. de Dreu, J., Ioannidou, V., 2006. The impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline. Unpublished manuscript, CentER discussion paper No. 5, Tilburg University.
10. Demigurc-Kunt A., and Detragiache E. Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability?. J. Monet. Econ. 49 (2002) 1373-1406
11. Demirgüç-Kunt A., Kane E., and Laeven L. Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design. J. Finan. Intermediation 17 (2008) 407-438
12. Dewatripont M., and Tirole J. The Prudential Regulation of Banks (1994), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
13. Diamond D., and Dybvig P. Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity. J. Polit. Economy 91 (1983) 401-419
14. Ellis D., and Flannery M. Does the debt market assess large banks' risk? Time series evidence from money center CDs. J. Monet. Econ. 30 (1992) 481-502
15. Flannery M., and Sorescu S. Evidence of market discipline in subordinated debenture yields: 1983-1991. J. Finance 51 (1996) 1347-1377
16. Graham J., Li S., and Qiu J. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. J. Finan. Econ. 88 (2008) 44-61
17. Gropp R., and Vesala J. Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring. Rev. Finan. 8 (2004) 571-602
18. Grossman R. Deposit insurance, regulation, and moral hazard in the thrift industry: evidence from the 1930s. Amer. Econ. Rev. 82 (1992) 800-821
19. Hovakimian A., and Kane E. Effectiveness of capital regulation at US commercial banks, 1985 to 1994. J. Finance 55 (2000) 451-469
20. Hovakimian A., Kane E., and Laeven L. How country and safety-net characteristics affect bank risk shifting. J. Finan. Services Res. 23 (2003) 177-204
21. Ioannidou, V., Ongena, S., 2008. "Time for a Change": loan conditions and bank behavior when firms switch banks. Unpublished manuscript, AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper.
22. Karels G., and McClatchey C. Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry. J. Banking Finance 23 (1999) 105-134
23. Kroszner R., and Strahan P. Obstacles to optimal policy: the interplay of politics and economics in shaping bank supervision and regulation reforms. In: Frederic S.M. (Ed). Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't (2001), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 233-273
24. Laeven L. The political economy of deposit insurance. J. Finan. Services Res. 26 (2004) 201-224
25. Luoto J., Mcintosh C., and Wydick B. Credit information systems in less developed countries: a test with microfinance in Guatemala. Econ. Devel. Cult. Change (2007) 313-334
26. Markus A., and Shaked I. The valuation of FDIC deposit insurance using option-pricing estimates. J. Money, Credit, Banking 16 (1984) 446-460
27. Martinez Peria M., and Schmukler S. Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises. J. Finance 56 (2001) 1029-1051
28. Merton R. An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees. J. Banking Finance 1 (1977) 3-11
29. Ortiz-Molina H., and Penas M. Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems. Small Bus. Econ. 30 (2008) 361-383
30. Park S., and Peristiani S. Market discipline by thrift depositors. J. Money, Credit, Banking 30 (1998) 347-364
31. Penas M., and Ünal H. Gains in bank mergers: evidence from the bond markets. J. Finan. Econ. 74 (2004) 149-179
32. Pennacchi G. A reexamination of the over- (under-) pricing of deposit insurance. J. Money, Credit, Banking 19 (1987) 340-360
33. Pennacchi G. Alternative forms of deposit insurance: pricing and bank incentive issues. J. Banking Finance 11 (1987) 291-312
34. Petersen M., and Rajan R. The benefits of lending relationships: evidence from small business data. J. Finance 49 (1994) 3-37
35. Ronn E., and Verma A. Pricing risk-adjusted deposit insurance: an option-based model. J. Finance 41 (1986) 871-895
36. Wheelock D. Deposit insurance and bank failures: new evidence from the 1920s. Econ. Inquiry 30 (1992) 530-543
37. Wheelock D., and Wilson P. Explaining bank failures: deposit insurance, regulation, and efficiency. Rev. Econ. Statist. 77 (1995) 689-700