The political economy of deposit insurance

Journal of Financial Services Research

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 201-224

  Laeven, Luc ^a  

^a Center for Economic and Policy Research   (United States)

Author keywords

Deposit insurance; political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 4444314666     PISSN: 09208550     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:FINA.0000040049.53563.e1     Document Type: Review

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