메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 30, Issue 12, 2006, Pages 3433-3452

Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan

Author keywords

Deposit insurance; Japanese banks; Market discipline

Indexed keywords


EID: 33750865684     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.01.009     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (59)

References (35)
  • 2
    • 0036119986 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Information and the market's perceptions of japanese bank risk: regulation, environment, and disclosure
    • Bremer M., and Pettway R. Information and the market's perceptions of japanese bank risk: regulation, environment, and disclosure. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 10 (2002) 119-139
    • (2002) Pacific-Basin Finance Journal , vol.10 , pp. 119-139
    • Bremer, M.1    Pettway, R.2
  • 3
    • 0041851527 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does the Japanese stock market price bank-risk? Evidence from financial firm failures
    • Brewer E., et al. Does the Japanese stock market price bank-risk? Evidence from financial firm failures. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35 (2003) 507-543
    • (2003) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol.35 , pp. 507-543
    • Brewer, E.1
  • 4
    • 84971688625 scopus 로고
    • Is deposit insurance necessary? A historical perspective
    • Calomiris C. Is deposit insurance necessary? A historical perspective. Journal of Economic History 50 (1990) 283-295
    • (1990) Journal of Economic History , vol.50 , pp. 283-295
    • Calomiris, C.1
  • 5
    • 0001594696 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Building an incentive-compatible safety net
    • Calomiris C. Building an incentive-compatible safety net. Journal of Banking and Finance 23 (1999) 1499-1519
    • (1999) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.23 , pp. 1499-1519
    • Calomiris, C.1
  • 6
    • 21844485702 scopus 로고
    • Repudiation risk and restitution costs: toward understanding premiums on insured deposits
    • Cook D., and Spellman L. Repudiation risk and restitution costs: toward understanding premiums on insured deposits. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 26 (1994) 439-459
    • (1994) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol.26 , pp. 439-459
    • Cook, D.1    Spellman, L.2
  • 9
    • 85010390101 scopus 로고
    • Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity
    • Diamond D., and Dybvig P. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983) 401-419
    • (1983) Journal of Political Economy , vol.91 , pp. 401-419
    • Diamond, D.1    Dybvig, P.2
  • 10
    • 0036793440 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
    • Demirguc-Kunt A., and Detragiache E. Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002) 1373-1406
    • (2002) Journal of Monetary Economics , vol.49 , pp. 1373-1406
    • Demirguc-Kunt, A.1    Detragiache, E.2
  • 12
    • 23044529415 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reforming bank capital regulation: using subordinated debt to enhance market and supervisory discipline
    • Evanoff D., and Wall L. Reforming bank capital regulation: using subordinated debt to enhance market and supervisory discipline. Contemporary Economic Policy 19 (2001) 444-453
    • (2001) Contemporary Economic Policy , vol.19 , pp. 444-453
    • Evanoff, D.1    Wall, L.2
  • 13
    • 0041181132 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Using market information in prudential bank supervision: a review of the US empirical evidence
    • Flannery M. Using market information in prudential bank supervision: a review of the US empirical evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30 (1998) 273-305
    • (1998) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol.30 , pp. 273-305
    • Flannery, M.1
  • 14
    • 33750881754 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Fukao, M., 2002. Financial Sector Profitability and Double-Gearing. NBER Working Papers 9368.
  • 15
    • 38249026321 scopus 로고
    • Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: a note
    • Furlong F., and Keeley M. Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: a note. Journal of Banking and Finance 13 (1989) 883-891
    • (1989) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.13 , pp. 883-891
    • Furlong, F.1    Keeley, M.2
  • 16
    • 0001530256 scopus 로고
    • Deposit insurance, regulation, and moral hazard in the thrift industry: evidence from the 1930's
    • Grossman R. Deposit insurance, regulation, and moral hazard in the thrift industry: evidence from the 1930's. American Economic Review 82 (1992) 800-821
    • (1992) American Economic Review , vol.82 , pp. 800-821
    • Grossman, R.1
  • 17
    • 33750850705 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Assessing the condition of Japanese banks: how informative are accounting earnings?
    • Asymmetries in Financial Globalization. Batavia B., Nicholas M., and Anastasios G. (Eds), APF Press, Toronto
    • Genay H. Assessing the condition of Japanese banks: how informative are accounting earnings?. In: Batavia B., Nicholas M., and Anastasios G. (Eds). Asymmetries in Financial Globalization. Studies in Economic Transformation and Public Policy (2002), APF Press, Toronto 141-161
    • (2002) Studies in Economic Transformation and Public Policy , pp. 141-161
    • Genay, H.1
  • 18
    • 0037634147 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises
    • Honohan P., and Klingebiel D. The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises. Journal of Banking and Finance 27 (2003) 1539-1560
    • (2003) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.27 , pp. 1539-1560
    • Honohan, P.1    Klingebiel, D.2
  • 19
    • 0036745841 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Deposit insurance and moral hazard: evidence from Texas banking in the 1920s
    • Hooks L., and Robinson K. Deposit insurance and moral hazard: evidence from Texas banking in the 1920s. Journal of Economic History 62 (2002) 833-853
    • (2002) Journal of Economic History , vol.62 , pp. 833-853
    • Hooks, L.1    Robinson, K.2
  • 20
    • 0036209414 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The convoy system for insolvent banks: how it originally worked and why it failed in the 1990s
    • Hoshi T. The convoy system for insolvent banks: how it originally worked and why it failed in the 1990s. Japan and the World Economy 14 (2002) 155-180
    • (2002) Japan and the World Economy , vol.14 , pp. 155-180
    • Hoshi, T.1
  • 22
    • 33750855335 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ito, T., Harada, K., 2000. Japan premium and stock prices: two mirrors of Japanese banking crises. NBER Working Papers 7997.
  • 24
    • 0039923092 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crisis
    • Martinez Peria M., and Schmukler S. Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crisis. Journal of Finance 56 (2001) 1029-1051
    • (2001) Journal of Finance , vol.56 , pp. 1029-1051
    • Martinez Peria, M.1    Schmukler, S.2
  • 25
    • 49449127434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • an analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees: an application of modern option pricing theory
    • Merton R. an analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees: an application of modern option pricing theory. Journal of Banking and Finance 1 (1997) 3-11
    • (1997) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.1 , pp. 3-11
    • Merton, R.1
  • 26
    • 0033446804 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bank time deposit rates and market discipline in poland: the impact of state ownership and deposit insurance reform
    • Mondschean T., and Opiela T. Bank time deposit rates and market discipline in poland: the impact of state ownership and deposit insurance reform. Journal of Financial Services Research 15 (1999) 179-196
    • (1999) Journal of Financial Services Research , vol.15 , pp. 179-196
    • Mondschean, T.1    Opiela, T.2
  • 27
    • 33745214716 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Do Small Depositors Exit from Bad Banks?: Evidence from Small Financial Institutions in Japan
    • Murata K., and Hori M. Do Small Depositors Exit from Bad Banks?: Evidence from Small Financial Institutions in Japan. Japan Economic Review 57 (2006) 260-278
    • (2006) Japan Economic Review , vol.57 , pp. 260-278
    • Murata, K.1    Hori, M.2
  • 28
    • 0035132699 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Determinants of the Japan premium: actions speak louder than words
    • Peek J., and Rosengren E. Determinants of the Japan premium: actions speak louder than words. Journal of International Economics 53 (2001) 283-305
    • (2001) Journal of International Economics , vol.53 , pp. 283-305
    • Peek, J.1    Rosengren, E.2
  • 29
    • 29544450516 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Unnatural selection: perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan
    • Peek J., and Rosengren E. Unnatural selection: perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. American Economic Review (2005) 1144-1166
    • (2005) American Economic Review , pp. 1144-1166
    • Peek, J.1    Rosengren, E.2
  • 30
    • 0038128461 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues
    • Sironi A. Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35 (2003) 443-472
    • (2003) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol.35 , pp. 443-472
    • Sironi, A.1
  • 31
    • 0036104807 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strengthening banks' market discipline and leveling the playing field: are the two compatible?
    • Sironi A. Strengthening banks' market discipline and leveling the playing field: are the two compatible?. Journal of Banking and Finance 26 (2002) 1065-1091
    • (2002) Journal of Banking and Finance , vol.26 , pp. 1065-1091
    • Sironi, A.1
  • 32
    • 1642318710 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolution of bank resolution policies in japan: evidence from market equity values
    • Spiegel M., and Yamori N. The evolution of bank resolution policies in japan: evidence from market equity values. Journal of Financial Research 27 (2004) 115-132
    • (2004) Journal of Financial Research , vol.27 , pp. 115-132
    • Spiegel, M.1    Yamori, N.2
  • 33
    • 0010668216 scopus 로고
    • The slack banker dances: deposit insurance and risk-taking in the banking collapse of the 1920s
    • Wheelock D., and Kumbhakar S. The slack banker dances: deposit insurance and risk-taking in the banking collapse of the 1920s. Explorations in Economic History 31 (1994) 357-375
    • (1994) Explorations in Economic History , vol.31 , pp. 357-375
    • Wheelock, D.1    Kumbhakar, S.2
  • 34
    • 21844508992 scopus 로고
    • Which banks choose deposit insurance? evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system
    • Wheelock D., and Kumbhakar S. Which banks choose deposit insurance? evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27 (1994) 186-201
    • (1994) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , vol.27 , pp. 186-201
    • Wheelock, D.1    Kumbhakar, S.2
  • 35
    • 0029500043 scopus 로고
    • Explaining bank failures: deposit insurance, regulation, and efficiency
    • Wheelock D., and Wilson P. Explaining bank failures: deposit insurance, regulation, and efficiency. Review of Economics and Statistics 77 (1995) 689-700
    • (1995) Review of Economics and Statistics , vol.77 , pp. 689-700
    • Wheelock, D.1    Wilson, P.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.