Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 811-822

  Çule, Monika ^a   Fulton, Murray ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF REGINA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

Author keywords

Corruption; Crime and punishment; Multiple equilibria; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350584929     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.005     Document Type: Article

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