The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving

Theory & Psychology

Volumn 19, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 624-645

  Bortolotti, Lisa ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

authority; authorship; belief; deliberation; introspection; justification; rationality; reflection; self knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350525040     PISSN: 09593543     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0959354309341921     Document Type: Article

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