SIM and the city: Rationalism in psychology and philosophy and Haidt's account of moral judgment

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 799-820

  Clarke, Steve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Emotivism; Haidt; Moral judgment; Rationalism; Social intuitionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049131007     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080802513250     Document Type: Article

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