Delusional beliefs and reason giving

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 21, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 821-841

  Bortolotti, Lisa ^a   Broome, Matthew R ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b Department of Psychiatry ^*

^c UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Authorship; Beliefs; Delusions; Intentionality; Rationality; Reason giving; Self knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 57049183076     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080802516212     Document Type: Article

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