Precaution v. avoidance: A comparison of liability rules

Economics Letters

Volumn 105, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 214-216

  Friehe, Tim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Avoidance activities; Care incentives; Liability rules; Negligence; Strict liability

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350391441     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.08.002     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Becker G.S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968) 169-217
2. Ganuza J.J., and Gomez F. Realistic standards: optimal negligence with limited liability. Journal of Legal Studies 37 (2008) 577-594
3. Innes R. Violator avoidance activities and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17 (2001) 239-256
4. Langlais E. Detection avoidance and deterrence: some paradoxical arithmetics. Journal of Public Economic Theory 10 (2008) 371-382
5. Malik A.S. Avoidance, screening, and optimum enforcement. RAND Journal of Economics 21 (1990) 341-353
6. Nussim J., and Tabbach A.D. Controlling avoidance: ex-ante regulation versus ex-post punishment. Review of Law and Economics 4 (2008) Article 4
7. Sanchirico C.W. Detection avoidance. New York University Law Review 81 (2006) 1331-1399
8. Strict Liability versus Negligence, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics.
9. Shavell S. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004), Harvard University Press, Cambridge
10. Young R., Faure M., and Fenn P. Defences in negligence: implications for tortfeasor care. International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006) 67-87