Realistic standards: Optimal negligence with limited liability

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 577-594

  Ganuza, Juan José ^a   Gómez, Fernando ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52249107546     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/586718     Document Type: Article

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