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1
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84937307131
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The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe
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See
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See Giandomenico Majone, "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe," Western European Politics, Vol. 17 (1994), pp. 77-101
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(1994)
Western European Politics
, vol.17
, pp. 77-101
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Majone, G.1
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2
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0000384524
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From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance
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Giandomenico Majone, "From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance," Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1997), pp. 136-67
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(1997)
Journal of Public Policy
, vol.17
, Issue.2
, pp. 136-67
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Majone, G.1
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3
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0035635650
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Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: The Politics of Regulatory State and the Politics of Negative Coordination
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Kanishka Jarasuriya, "Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: The Politics of Regulatory State and the Politics of Negative Coordination," Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2001), pp. 101-23
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(2001)
Journal of European Public Policy
, vol.8
, Issue.1
, pp. 101-23
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Jarasuriya, K.1
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4
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0141953167
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The Politics of Liberalisation: Privatisation and Regulation-for-competition in Europe's and Latin America's Telecoms and Electricity Industries
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David Levi-Faur, "The Politics of Liberalisation: Privatisation and Regulation-for-competition in Europe's and Latin America's Telecoms and Electricity Industries," European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42 (2003), pp. 705-40
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(2003)
European Journal of Political Research
, vol.42
, pp. 705-740
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Levi-Faur, D.1
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5
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84881786865
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Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue, and David Parker (eds), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
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Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue, and David Parker (eds), Leading Issues in Competition, Regulation, and Development (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004)
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(2004)
Leading Issues in Competition, Regulation, and Development
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6
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14144252611
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The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe
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March
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Fabrizio Gilardi, "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 598 (March 2005), pp. 84-101
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(2005)
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
, vol.598
, pp. 84-101
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Gilardi, F.1
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7
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14144254772
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The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order
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March
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Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, "The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 598 (March 2005), pp. 102-24
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(2005)
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
, vol.598
, pp. 102-24
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Jordana, J.1
Levi-Faur, D.2
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8
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33745698635
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Towards a Latin American Regulatory State? The Diffusion of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies across Countries and Sectors
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Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, "Towards a Latin American Regulatory State? The Diffusion of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies across Countries and Sectors," International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 29, Nos. 4-6 (2006), p. 335-66.
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(2006)
International Journal of Public Administration
, vol.29
, Issue.4-6
, pp. 335-66
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Jordana, J.1
Levi-Faur, D.2
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9
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70350218167
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The Telecommunications Agency was renamed the Information Technologies and Communication Agency by the Electronic Communication Law of November 2008. In this article, the agency will be referred to by its original name
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The Telecommunications Agency was renamed the Information Technologies and Communication Agency by the Electronic Communication Law of November 2008. In this article, the agency will be referred to by its original name.
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10
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70350235842
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There is also the Higher Board of Radio and Television (HBRT), which was created in 1994 as an IRA to regulate, oversee, and sanction all entities involved in broadcasting. The HBRT is excluded from the sample as it is functionally differentiated from the economic sector IRAs. In addition, two more recently created regulatory agencies, namely the Sugar Agency (2001) and the Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency (2002), are also excluded from this study. These agricultural sector agencies were created with very little independence from governmental influence in terms of decision-making and financial matters; consequently, they do not meet the independence criteria for IRAs. The law that established the Sugar Agency also contained a sunset clause that went into effect at the beginning of 2005, and this agency is now extinct
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There is also the Higher Board of Radio and Television (HBRT), which was created in 1994 as an IRA to regulate, oversee, and sanction all entities involved in broadcasting. The HBRT is excluded from the sample as it is functionally differentiated from the economic sector IRAs. In addition, two more recently created regulatory agencies, namely the Sugar Agency (2001) and the Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency (2002), are also excluded from this study. These agricultural sector agencies were created with very little independence from governmental influence in terms of decision-making and financial matters; consequently, they do not meet the independence criteria for IRAs. The law that established the Sugar Agency also contained a sunset clause that went into effect at the beginning of 2005, and this agency is now extinct.
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11
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0036174460
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Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
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Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet, "Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions," West European Politics, Vol. 25, No.1 (2002), p. 2.
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(2002)
West European Politics
, vol.25
, Issue.1
, pp. 2
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Thatcher, M.1
Sweet A., S.2
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12
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0034179207
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Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
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Kaare Strøm
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Kaare Strøm, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 37 (2000), pp. 261-70.
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(2000)
European Journal of Political Research
, vol.37
, pp. 261-70
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Strøm, K.1
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13
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84975960792
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Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLBR
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Terry Moe, Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLBR, Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 2 (1987), p. 236-99.
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(1987)
Studies in American Political Development
, vol.2
, pp. 236-99
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Moe, T.1
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14
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70350213793
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See Gul Sosay and Unal Zenginobuz, "Independent Regulatory Agencies in Emerging Economies," Boǧaziçi University, Research Papers, ISS/EC 2005-10
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See Gul Sosay and Unal Zenginobuz, "Independent Regulatory Agencies in Emerging Economies," Boǧaziçi University, Research Papers, ISS/EC 2005-10.
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15
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1542421774
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The Problem of Ensuring the Accountability of Public Officials
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in J. G. Jabbra and O. P. Dwevidi (eds.), Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press
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Gerald Caiden, "The Problem of Ensuring the Accountability of Public Officials," in J. G. Jabbra and O. P. Dwevidi (eds.), Public Service Accountability: A Comparative Perspective (Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 25.
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(1998)
Public Service Accountability: A Comparative Perspective
, pp. 25
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Caiden, G.1
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16
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70350230956
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Independent Regulatory Authorities in OECD Countries: An Overview
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in OECD, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London, January 10-11
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Stéphane Jacobzone, "Independent Regulatory Authorities in OECD Countries: An Overview," in OECD, Designing Independent and Accountable Regulatory Authorities For High Quality Regulation, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London, January 10-11, 2005, p. 98.
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(2005)
Designing Independent and Accountable Regulatory Authorities For High Quality Regulation
, pp. 98
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Jacobzone, S.1
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17
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70350246942
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An Accountability Framework for Regulatory Agencies and Tribunals
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available at
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Margot Priest, "An Accountability Framework for Regulatory Agencies and Tribunals," IPMN Conference Papers (1998), p. 5, available at: www.inpuma.net/research/papers/salem/stanbury.doc.
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(1998)
IPMN Conference Papers
, pp. 5
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Priest, M.1
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18
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47349089193
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The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors-Principles and Practice
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Eva Hupkes, Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor, "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors-Principles and Practice," European Business Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 6 (2005), pp. 1575-621.
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(2005)
European Business Law Review
, vol.16
, Issue.6
, pp. 1575-621
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Hupkes, E.1
Quintyn, M.2
Taylor M., W.3
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19
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0345813282
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Accountability in Regulatory State
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Colin Scott, Accountability in Regulatory State, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2000), pp. 38-60
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(2000)
Journal of Law and Society
, vol.27
, Issue.1
, pp. 38-60
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Scott, C.1
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20
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36348933666
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House of Lords, 6th Report, Select Committee on Constitution (2004), available at
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House of Lords, The Regulatory State: Ensuring Its Accountability, 6th Report, Select Committee on Constitution (2004), available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/Id200304/Idselect/Idconst/68/ 6803.htm
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(2004)
The Regulatory State: Ensuring Its Accountability
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21
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70350243900
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Scott, Accountability in Regulatory State
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Scott, Accountability in Regulatory State.
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23
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0032968089
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The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems
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See
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See Giandomenico Majone, "The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems," West European Politics, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1-24
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(1999)
West European Politics
, vol.22
, Issue.1
, pp. 1-24
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Majone, G.1
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25
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70350219906
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Consequences of Legitimizing Independent Regulatory Agencies in Contemporary Democracies: Theoretical Scenarios
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in Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi (eds.), London: Routledge
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Gul Sosay, "Consequences of Legitimizing Independent Regulatory Agencies in Contemporary Democracies: Theoretical Scenarios," in Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi (eds.), Delegation in Contemporary Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 171-90.
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(2006)
Delegation in Contemporary Democracies
, pp. 171-90
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Sosay, G.1
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26
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33846430660
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Accountability and Transparency in Regulation: Critiques, Doctrines and Instruments
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in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds.), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
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Martin Lodge, "Accountability and Transparency in Regulation: Critiques, Doctrines and Instruments," in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds.), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004).
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(2004)
The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance
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Lodge, M.1
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27
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84879986542
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'Accountability': An Ever-Expanding Concept
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Also, for a related discussion, see
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Also, for a related discussion, see Richard Mulgan, "'Accountability': An Ever-Expanding Concept," Public Administration, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2000), pp. 555-73.
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(2000)
Public Administration
, vol.78
, Issue.3
, pp. 555-73
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Mulgan, R.1
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36
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70350211988
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According to the Turkish Constitution, the Turkish administrative structure is unitary in nature in the sense that the executive branch is to be considered as constituting a whole in relation to all central and other (decentralized) administrative units constituting the state. Therefore, a strict indivisibility of administration is envisaged, and even the agencies with separate public legal personality are considered as being under the tutelage control of the center. In the case of agencies created with their own public legal personality, the indivisibility of administration is established by relating the agency to a ministry. The status of relatedness constitutes an obvious violation of the notion of independence for an IRA. To get around this issue, the IRAs established later were declared as being affiliated with a ministry rather than being related to it. This has been a creative piece of lawmaking as there is no previous mention of this notion in the Turkish administrative law
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According to the Turkish Constitution, the Turkish administrative structure is unitary in nature in the sense that the executive branch is to be considered as constituting a whole in relation to all central and other (decentralized) administrative units constituting the state. Therefore, a strict indivisibility of administration is envisaged, and even the agencies with separate public legal personality are considered as being under the tutelage control of the center. In the case of agencies created with their own public legal personality, the indivisibility of administration is established by relating the agency to a ministry. The status of relatedness constitutes an obvious violation of the notion of independence for an IRA. To get around this issue, the IRAs established later were declared as being affiliated with a ministry rather than being related to it. This has been a creative piece of lawmaking as there is no previous mention of this notion in the Turkish administrative law.
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37
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70350237712
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Within the BRSA, a standing Financial Sector Commission, composed of the representatives of the agency, the affiliated ministry and state institutions, including the CMB and the CA, as well as the gold and stock exchanges, and sector associations is established by law. However, rather than providing a sanctioned means of consultation for the BRSA, the Commission presents its reports to the Council of Ministers
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Within the BRSA, a standing Financial Sector Commission, composed of the representatives of the agency, the affiliated ministry and state institutions, including the CMB and the CA, as well as the gold and stock exchanges, and sector associations is established by law. However, rather than providing a sanctioned means of consultation for the BRSA, the Commission presents its reports to the Council of Ministers.
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38
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70350224878
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According to their founding laws, while the institution of financial oversight for the CA, TA, and the PPA was the the Court of Accounts, the EMRA was to be audited by the Supreme Supervision Board of the Prime Ministry, which was originally created to oversee the activities as well as the financial accounts of the state-owned enterprises in Turkey. On the other hand, the law establishing the BRSA specified that the affiliated minister (a minister of state) would have the financial accounts of the agency audited by a committee appointed by the minister himself/herself and composed of an inspector from the Court of Accounts, an inspector from the Ministry of Finance, and an inspector from the Prime Minister's Office, whereas the law instituting the CMB asserted that the minister has it audited, but it did not specify by whom. The first effort to harmonize the mechanisms of financial accountability for the IRAs in Turkey was the adoption of Law No. 4743 in 2002. It included a paragraph stating that the financial accounts of the IRAs were to be overseen by a commission composed of an inspector appointed by the Prime Ministry, an auditor from the Supreme Supervision Board of the Prime Ministry, and an inspector of the Ministry of Finance. Although this paragraph was annulled by the Constitutional Court a few months after its adoption, this annulment could go into effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette on March 14, 2006.
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39
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70350211990
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The Court of Accounts, under the Constitution and the Law on the Court of Accounts, is responsible for auditing on behalf of the Grand National Assembly (parliament), the revenues, expenditures, and property of government offices operated under the general and annexed budgets. With the 1996 amendment to its law, the court was also given the task of examining the extent to which the government offices under its jurisdiction use their resources with due regard to economic efficiency and effectiveness
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The Court of Accounts, under the Constitution and the Law on the Court of Accounts, is responsible for auditing on behalf of the Grand National Assembly (parliament), the revenues, expenditures, and property of government offices operated under the general and annexed budgets. With the 1996 amendment to its law, the court was also given the task of examining the extent to which the government offices under its jurisdiction use their resources with due regard to economic efficiency and effectiveness.
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40
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70350227836
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According to the Constitution, the Council of State is the last instance for reviewing decisions and judgments given by administrative courts that are not referred by law to other administrative courts. It shall also be the first and last instance for dealing with specific cases prescribed by law
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According to the Constitution, the Council of State is the last instance for reviewing decisions and judgments given by administrative courts that are not referred by law to other administrative courts. It shall also be the first and last instance for dealing with specific cases prescribed by law.
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41
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70350229572
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The terms of the chair and board members of the PPA are non-renewable by its founding law. By an amendment to the 1999 Banking Law founding the BRSA, the terms of its chair and board members were changed from renewable to non-renewable in 2005
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The terms of the chair and board members of the PPA are non-renewable by its founding law. By an amendment to the 1999 Banking Law founding the BRSA, the terms of its chair and board members were changed from renewable to non-renewable in 2005.
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42
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70350237715
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A board member of the CA mentioned that because of the judicial character of the CA decisions, the Council of the State did not wish to be the primary court of appeals and took it to the Constitutional Court but lost
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A board member of the CA mentioned that because of the judicial character of the CA decisions, the Council of the State did not wish to be the primary court of appeals and took it to the Constitutional Court but lost.
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