Information and the hold-up problem

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 405-423

  Hermalin, Benjamin E ^a   Katz, Michael L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350138704     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00071.x     Document Type: Article

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