A governance-structure approach to voluntary organizations

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

Volumn 38, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 761-783

  Enjolras, Bernard ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH   (Norway)

Author keywords

Coordination failure; Governance; Reciprocity; Trustworthiness; Voluntary organizations

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350073800     PISSN: 08997640     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0899764008320030     Document Type: Article

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