An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 27, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 639-645

  Brenner, Steffen ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Amnesty; Antitrust; Cartel stability; Leniency; Self reporting

Indexed keywords

AMNESTY; ANTITRUST; CARTEL STABILITY; LENIENCY; SELF-REPORTING;

COMPETITION;

EID: 70349733182     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.007     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Abreu D. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 56 (1988) 383-396
2. Apesteguia J., Dufwenberg M., and Selten R. Blowing the whistle. Economic Theory 31 (2007) 143-166
3. Aubert C., Kovacic W., and Rey P. The impact of leniency programs on cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization 6 (2005) 1241-1266
4. Chen J., and Harrington J. The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path. In: Ghosal V., and Stennek J. (Eds). The Political Economy of Antitrust (2007), Elsevier, Amsterdam
5. Dick A.R. When are cartels stable contracts?. Journal of Law and Economics 39 (1996) 241-283
6. Ellis C., and Wilson W. Cartels, price fixing, and corporate leniency: What doesn't kill us makes us stronger (2003), University of Oregon Manuscript
7. European Commission. Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases. Official Journal of the European Commission C 207 (1996) 4-6
8. European Commission. Guidelines on the method of setting fines. Official Journal of the European Commission C 9 (1998)
9. European Commission. Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. Official Journal of the European Commission C 45 (2002) 3-5
10. Evenett S.J., Levenstein M.C., and Suslow V.Y. International cartel enforcement: lessons from the 1990s. World Economy (2001) 1221-1245
11. Green E.J., and Porter R.H. Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica 52 (1984) 87-100
12. Harrington, J.E., Chang, M.-H., in press. Modelling the birth and death of cartels with an application to evaluating antitrust policy, Journal of the European Economic Association.
13. Harsanyi J., and Selten R. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988), MIT Press, Cambridge MA
14. Hay G.A., and Kelley D. An empirical survey of price fixing conspiracies. Journal of Law and Economics 17 (1974) 13-38
15. Hinloopen J., and Soetevent A. Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs. RAND Journal of Economics 2 (2008) 607-616
16. Jacquemin A., Nambu T., and Dewez I. A dynamic analysis of export cartels: the Japanese case. Economic Journal 91 (1981) 685-696
17. Kaplow L., and Shavell S. Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior. Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994) 583-606
18. Kiefer N.M. Economic duration data and hazard functions. Journal of Economic Literature 26 (1988) 646-679
19. Levenstein M. Price wars and the stability of collusion: a study of the Pre-World War I bromine industry. Journal of Industrial Economics 45 (1997) 117-138
20. Marquez J. Life expectancy of international cartels: an empirical analysis. Review of Industrial Organization 9 (1994) 331-341
21. Miller, N.H., 2008. Strategic leniency and cartel enforcement, American Economic Review, forthcoming.
22. Motchenkova, E., 2004. The effects of leniency programs on the bahevior of firms participating in cartel agreements. Mimeo.
23. Motchenkova, E., van der Lann, R., 2005. Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms. enter Discussion Paper 74.
24. Motta M., and Polo M. Leniency programs and cartel prosecution. International Journal of Industrial Organization (2003) 347-379
25. Posner R.A. A statistical study of antitrust enforcement. Journal of Law and Economics 13 (1970) 365-419
26. Schinkel M.P., Carree M., and Günster A. European antitrust policy: an empirical analysis of Commission decisions and their appeal histories, 1964-2001. Paper presented at the EARIE 2004, Berlin (2004)
27. Slade M. Price wars in price-setting supergames. Economica (1989) 295-310
28. Spagnolo, G., 2004. Divide et impera: Optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels (and organized crime), Mimeo.
29. Spagnolo G. Leniency and whistleblowers in antitrust. In: Buccirossi P. (Ed). Handbook of Antitrust Economics (2008), MIT Press, Cambridge MA, US
30. Suslow, V., 1991. Cartel contract duration: Empirical evidence from international cartels, Mimeo.