Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 427-443

  Asheim, Geir B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009664232     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2971722     Document Type: Article

References (35)

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