ON THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR CALIFORNIAN ORGANISATIONS

Financial Accountability and Management

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 309-329

  Jegers, Marc ^a   Verschueren, Ilse ^a  

^a VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349450498     PISSN: 02674424     EISSN: 14680408     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0408.2006.00428.x     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Agung, J. (2000), ‘Financial Constraints, Firms' Investments and the Channels of Monetary Policy in Indonesia’, Applied Economics, Vol. 32, No. 12, pp. 1637–46.
2. Baber, W.R., P.L. Daniel and A.A. Roberts (2002), ‘Compensation to Managers of Charitable Organizations: An Empirical Study of the Role of Accounting Measures of Program Activities’, Accounting Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 679–93.
3. Bacon, P. (1992), ‘Do Capital Structure Theories Apply to Nonprofit Hospitals?’, Journal of the Midwest Finance Association, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 86–90.
4. Bothwell, R.O. (2001), ‘Trends in Self-regulation and Transparency of Nonprofit Organizations in the U.S.’, Third Workshop on The Challenges of Managing the Third Sector (European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Brussels).
5. Bowman, W. (2002), ‘The Uniqueness of Nonprofit Finance and the Decision to Borrow’, Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 293–311.
6. Brickley, J.A. and R.L. Van Horn (2002), ‘Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organisations: Evidence from Hospitals’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 227–49.
7. Calem, P.S. and J.A. Rizzo (1994), ‘Financing Constraints and Investment: New Evidence from Hospital Industry Data’, Philadelphia, FRB-ERD Working Paper 94-9.
8. Chang, C.F. and H.P. Tuckman (1990), ‘Why Do Nonprofit Managers Accumulate Surpluses, and How Much Do They Accumulate?’, Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 117–35.
9. Chang, C.F. and H.P. Tuckman (1994), ‘Revenue Diversification Among Non-profits’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 273–90.
10. Deloof, M. (1995), ‘Liquiditeit, financieringsbeperkingen en investeringen van grote Belgische ondernemingen (Liquidity, financing constraints and investments of large Belgian firms)’, Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, Vol. 145, No. 1, pp. 55–92.
11. Dongili, P. (1997), ‘Financing the Third Sector: Aspects and Problems’, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 763–83.
12. Eldenburg, L. and C.C. Vines (2004), ‘Nonprofit Classification Decisions in Response to a Change in Accounting Rules’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1–22.
13. Erus, B. and B.A. Weisbrod (2003), ‘Objective Functions and Compensation Structures in Nonprofit and For-profit Organizations: Evidence from the ‘Mixed’ Hospital Industry’, in E.L. Glaeser (ed.), The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
14. Fama, E.F. and M.C. Jensen (1985), ‘Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 101–19.
15. Fazzari, S.M., R.G. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen (1996), ‘Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment: Response to Kaplan and Zingales’, Cambridge, NBER-Working Paper 5462.
16. Fazzari, S.M., R.G. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen (2000), ‘Investment-cash Flow Sensitivities Are Useful: A Comment on Kaplan and Zingales’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 695–705.
17. Fisman, R. and R.G. Hubbard (2003), ‘The Role of Nonprofit Endowments’, in E.L. Glaeser (ed.), The Governance of Not-for-profit Organizations (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
18. Fournier, G.M. and E.S. Campbell (1997), ‘Indigent Care as Quid Pro Quo in Hospital Regulation’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 669–73.
19. Friend, I. and J. Hasbrouck (1988), ‘Determinants of Capital Structure’, Research in Finance, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1–19.
20. Friend, I. and L.H.P. Lang (1988), ‘An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate Capital Structure’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 271–81.
21. Froelich, K.A. (1999), ‘Diversification of Revenue Strategies: Evolving Resource Dependence in Nonprofit Organizations’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 246–68.
22. Froelich, K.A. and T.W. Knoepfle (1996), ‘Internal Revenue Service 990 Data: Fact or Fiction?’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 40–52.
23. Froelich, K.A., T.W. Knoepfle and T.H. Pollak (2000), ‘Financial Measures in Nonprofit Organizations Research: Comparing IRS 990 Return and Audited Financial Statement Data’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 232–54.
24. Gentry, W.M. (2002), ‘Debt, Investment and Endowment Accumulation: The Case of Not-for-Profit Hospitals’, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 845–72.
25. Hayashi, F. (1982), ‘Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation’, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 213–24.
26. Hoshi, T., A.K. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein (1991), ‘Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 1, pp. 33–60.
27. Hubbard, R.G. (1998), ‘Capital-market Imperfections and Investment’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 193–225.
28. Jegers, M. (1997), ‘Portfolio Theory and Nonprofit Financial Stability: A Comment and Extension’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 65–72.
29. Jegers, M. and W. Buijink (1987), ‘The Reliability of Financial Accounting Data Bases: Some Belgian Evidence’, International Journal of Accounting: Education and Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1–21.
30. Jensen, M.C. (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers’, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 323–29.
31. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 305–60.
32. Jones, A.M. (2000), ‘Health Econometrics’, in A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse (eds.), Handbook of Health Economics (North-Holland Elsevier, Amsterdam).
33. Kaplan, S.N. and L. Zingales (2000), ‘Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Are Not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 707–12.
34. Kingma, B.R. (1993), ‘Portfolio Theory and Nonprofit Financial Stability’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 105–19.
35. Ligon, J.A. (1997), ‘The Capital Structure of Hospitals and Reimbursement Policy’, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 59–77.
36. Myers, S.C. (1984), ‘The Capital Structure Puzzle’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 575–92.
37. Ozkan, N. (2002), ‘Effects of Financial Constraints on Research and Development Investment: An Empirical Investigation’, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 12, No. 11, pp. 827–34.
38. Preyra, C. and G. Pink (2001), ‘Balancing Incentives in the Compensation Contracts of Nonprofit Hospital CEOs’, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 509–25.
39. Rajan, R.G. and L. Zingales (1995), ‘What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 1421–60.
40. Roomkin, M.J. and B.A. Weisbrod (1999), ‘Managerial Compensation and Incentives in for-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 750–81.
41. Sloan, F.A., J. Valvona, M. Hassan and M.A. Morrisey (1988), ‘Cost of Capital to the Hospital Sector’, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 25–45.
42. Steinberg, R. (1990), ‘Profits and Incentive Compensation in Nonprofit Firms’, Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 137–52.
43. Steinberg, R. and B.H. Gray (1993), ‘“The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise” in 1993: Hansmann Revisited’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 297–316.
44. Tuckman, H.P. (1993), ‘How and Why Nonprofit Organizations Obtain Capital’, in D.C. Hammack and D.R. Young (eds.), Nonprofit Organizations in a Market Economy (Jossey-Bass; San Fransisco).
45. Wedig, G.J. (1994), ‘Risk, Leverage, Donations and Dividends-in-Kind: A Theory of Nonprofit Financial Behavior’, International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 257–78.
46. Wedig, G.J., M. Hassan and M.A. Morrisey (1996), ‘Tax-exempt Debt and the Capital Structure of Nonprofit Organizations: An Application to Hospitals’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 1247–83.
47. Wedig, G.J., M. Hassan and F.A. Sloan (1989), ‘Hospital Investment Decisions and the Cost of Capital’, Journal of Business, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 517–37.
48. Wedig, G.J., F.A. Sloan, M. Hassan and M.A. Morrisey (1988), ‘Capital Structure, Ownership, and Capital Payment Policy: The Case of Hospitals’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 21–40.