Sentence reduction as a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 97, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1509-1566

  Starr, Sonja B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 70349445253     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (556)

1. Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L.& PUB. POL'Y 111, 112(2003).
2. See infra Part I.
3. Eg., Chraidi v. Germany, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, ¶¶ 24-25 (2006) (excessive pretrial detention);
4. Scordino v. Italy (No.1), 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, ¶¶ 185-86 (2006) (speedy trial);
5. Mathew v. Netherlands, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, ¶¶ 148-49 (2005) (unlawful conditions of detention).
6. Eg., Salah v. Netherlands, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55, ¶¶ 30-40, 74 (2006) (discussing Dutch cases);
7. Yetkinsekerci v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, ¶8 (2005) (quoting U.K. case).
8. Eg., R. v. MacPherson, [1995] 166 N.B.R.2d 81, ¶¶ 15-16 (Can.) (remedying delay before arraignment);
9. R. v. Stannard, [1989] 79 Sask. R. 257, ¶ 12 (Can.) (unlawful search).
10. E.g., Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, ¶¶ 74-75 (Mar. 31, 2000) (unlawful delay in indictment and appointment of counsel);
11. see Sonja Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 717-18 (2008).
12. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972));
13. see infra section V.A.
14. United States v. Dicus, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1159-61 (N.D. Iowa 2008);
15. see Sonja B. Starr, Using Sentencing to Clean Up Criminal Procedure: Incorporating Remedial Sentence Reduction Into Federal Sentencing Law, 21 FED. SENT'G. REP. 29, 29 (2008) (discussing Dicus).
16. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 116.
17. Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 73-74 (1994).
18. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 116-17;
19. Caldwell & Chase, supra note 10, at 68-71.
20. Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119,136(2003).
21. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 116.
22. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 136.
23. Id.. at 127-129, 138.
24. With regard to his first point, Kamisar cites no studies of police attitudes concerning sentencing, and I have found none. However, Josh Bowers notes that low sentences sometimes help police effectiveness by reducing community resentment, suggesting that police might not prefer higher sentences. See Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 93-94 (2007).
25. In addition, one recent study found that increased prosecutorial screening of cases did not affect police practices-police were "willing to suffer a refusal to prosecute." Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2059 (2006).
26. If police are indifferent to whether their cases are prosecuted at all, they probably do not care about sentences either-but this would also mean that the exclusionary rule itself would have limited deterrent effect. In support of his second argument, Kamisar, supra note 12, at 138-39, observes that under a direct sanction system for INS officers who conduct unlawful searches, sanctions were almost never invoked.
27. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). Kamisar also cites evidence of the political power of police, Kamisar, supra note 12 at 129 (noting failure of "many other 'direct sanctions' proposals"), and scholarship arguing that judges often tolerate police perjury, id at 130. As I show in Part I, courts virtually never directly sanction prosecutors. It seems plausible that mey would similarly abstain from sanctioning police, especially given the Supreme Court's recent suggestion that police departments can be trusted to handle discipline for Fourth Amendment violations internally.
28. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting me court's "oft-expressed concern over the frequency with which improper prosecution" occurs);
30. Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 631 (1972);
31. Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 369 (2007) (noting that "prosecutorial misconduct is wide-spread and has infected every aspect of the criminal trial.");
32. Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 46 (2005) (noting that prosecutorial misconduct has tripled in the last decade, according to the Department of Justice);
33. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 399, 399-400 (citing study documenting hundreds of homicide cases that were reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct);
34. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 890 (1995);
35. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965, 966, 975 (1984).
36. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1935) (giving examples of prosecutorial misconduct and defining it as "overstep[ing] the bounds of... propriety and fairness").
37. E.g., Cicchini, supra note 17, at 336;
38. Joy, supra note 17, at 425-26;
39. Meares, supra note 17, at 893-898
40. E.g., Cicchini, supra note 17, at 336.
41. E.g., id at 363-64;
42. see Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 666-67 (2001) (reviewing empirical evidence);
43. J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 95-108 (1990).
44. Steele, supra note 17, at 976-77;
45. accord Alschuler, supra note 17, at 645, 647;
46. cf. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Despite numerous threats to reverse convictions for prosecutorial misconduct, federal courts have seldom invoked that sanction.").
47. See infra section V.C.
48. E.g., Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice and the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311, 333 (1985);
49. Alschuler, supra note 17, at 659;
50. Meares, supra note 17, at 900-01;
51. see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 182-92 (2001) (reviewing 1222 criminal procedure cases-not limited to prosecutorial misconduct-and finding that courts invoked the harmless error doctrine in 87% of them, with 45% finding harmless error and 42% finding that any error, if it existed, was harmless).
52. United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691-692 (7th Cir. 1990).
53. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990).
54. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
55. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2005, 2015, 2021 (1998);
56. see Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9,16 (1997);
57. infra section V.B.
58. Barker v. Wmgo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972);
59. see infra section V.A.
60. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 539 (1975);
61. see United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd 412 U.S. 434 (1973);
62. SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL 230 (2006);
63. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 646 (1996).
64. HERMAN, supra note 30, at 212.
65. Id... at 231.
66. E.g., Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738 (1992);
67. Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1370 (2001);
68. Daryl J. Levirison, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884-85 (1999). I have elsewhere described a number of examples of remedial deterrence in international courts. Starr, supra note 6, at 710-736
69. Levinson, supra note 33, at 884-885
70. Eg., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 (1994);
71. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 112;
72. Kamisar, supra note 12, at 133-34;
73. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 401-03;
74. see also J.A.E. Pottow, Constitutional Remedies in the Criminal Context: A Unified Approach to Section 24 (Part II), 44 CRIM. L.Q. 34, 64-68 (2000) (describing remedial deterrence in context of exclusion of coerced selfincriminatory evidence in Canada).
75. Stephen D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 683,736 (1997).
76. See JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND ADVISORS 240 (2006) (noting that under a regime in which the sole penalty for a nonprofit's regulatory violation was loss of tax-exempt status, regulators could not win cases, necessitating the adoption of less harsh intermediate sanctions).
77. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 599, 601 (2004) (arguing that the availability of a less intrusive remedy, remand without vacatur, "facilitates the use of more aggressive judicial scrutiny" of agency decisions).
78. Eg., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986);
79. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007), cert, denied, 128 S. Ct. 867 (2008);
80. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981);
81. Stringer v. Mississippi, 627 So. 2d 326, 330 (Miss. 1993).
82. Alschuler, supra note 17, at 663;
83. Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 95;
84. Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Government Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 644 (1982).
85. Retrial is precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause when the prosecutor's misconduct was intended to trigger a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982). In other cases, retrial might be precluded in practice by loss of evidence or it might result in an acquittal (even if the defendant is in fact guilty).
86. See Posner, supra note 40, at 644.
87. See, e.g., Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984) (describing me "windfall of automatic reversal");
88. Kansas v. Bolen, 13 P.3d 1270,1274 (Kan. 2000) (noting that "dismissal with prejudice may serve to punish the public and provide a windfall for the defendant");
89. North Dakota v. Tweeten, 679 N.W.2d 287,291-294 (N.D. 2004) (same).
90. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008).
91. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405-406 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Few things have ... contributed more to lowered public confidence in the courts, man the interminable appeals, the retrials, and the lack of finality.").
92. See, e.g., Patricia L. Garcia, Austin College Welcomes Texas Supreme Court, 70 TEX. B.J. 446, 446 (2007) (observing that a Tennessee state supreme court chief justice was unseated because "the public perceived [a controversial] ruling to be a reversal" even though it was really a remand);
93. Michael Hall, And Justice For Some, TEX. MONTHLY, NOV. 1, 2004, at 154;
94. R.G. Ratcliffe, Opinions Divided On Judge in Dispute Over Condemned Man, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 10, 2007, at Bl;
95. Dennis B. Roddy, Judges Can't Dismiss Popular Opinion, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, July 14,1991, at B1.
96. Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 212-213 (1988).
97. E.g., Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 828-31 (1999);
98. Kelly Gier, Note, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 A.M. J. CRIM. L. 191, 205-12 (2006).
99. See Alschuler, supra note 17, at 633, 673-74 (stating that a survey of twenty-five years of reported decisions found no examples of courts imposing sanctions on prosecutors);
100. Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 84 n.146 (noting that the use of contempt sanctions has remained extremely infrequent in the decades since Alschuler's article);
101. id at 83-84 (noting that other criminal sanctions are available but essentially never used);
102. Meares, supra note 17, at 893-97;
103. Steele, supra note 17, at 978, 981. In contrast, the Center for Public Integrity's study of appellate opinions nationwide between 1970 and 2003 found 2012 cases in which courts granted the defendant a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct See Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct?, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, June 26, 2003, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/ default.aspx?sID=main (noting, however, that this still means reversals are a "relative rarity").
104. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185-86 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1981);
105. Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 72;
106. Henning, supra note 47, at 830-831
107. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427-28 (1976);
108. Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 75.
109. Eg., Joy, supra note 17, at 427;
110. Steele, supra note 17, at 982-88;
111. Gier, supra note 47, at 205.
112. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393,445 (1992) ("[D]espite the recognized frequency of misconduct by prosecutors in argument to the jury, this writer has found only one decision" in which such conduct resulted in discipline.);
113. Meares, supra note 17, at 899;
114. Steele, supra note 17, at 966, 981-82;
115. Gier, supra note 47, at 201.
116. Gershman, supra note 52, at 445.
117. Gier, supra note 47, at 201.
118. See Alschuler, supra note 17, at 669.
119. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-428 (1976).
120. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 17, at 670;
121. Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284 (1988).
122. See Meltzer, supra note 57, at 284.
123. Meares, supra note 17, at 892-893
124. See Posner, supra note 40, at 637. For some forms of misconduct, there may be little cost to overdeterrence, however.
125. See Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 88 (discussing disclosure).
126. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 345, 361-62, 420 (2000).
127. See Cicchini, supra note 17, at 336 (proposing requiring mistrial, plus dismissal with prejudice if misconduct was intentional);
128. Joy, supra note 17, at 427;
129. Kenneth Williams, The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1200 (2002).
130. See infra Part VI (discussing the need to balance flexibility with reduction of disparity);
131. Starr, supra note 8, at 33 (developing this proposal in the federal context).
132. If a short base sentence has already been completely served when the appeal is decided, sentence reduction would not be a viable appellate remedy, In such cases, courts could perhaps be empowered instead to take steps to mitigate the collateral consequences of the conviction, possibly including vacating the conviction entirely even if the error was "harmless." See infra notes 211-212 and accompanying text (likewise suggesting this alternative for cases involving rehabilitative sentences).
133. See infra section IV.D (discussing valuation difficulties associated with such tailoring).
134. Sentence reduction could also supplement reversal-the defendant could be entitled to a reduction if reconvicted to compensate for the stress and inconvenience of being tried twice. This Article does not focus on that possibility but instead on sentence reduction as an alternative to remedies that courts are rarely willing to invoke; obviously, using it as an additional remedy would not solve this remediai deterrence problem.
135. See infra section IVE (discussing sentencing objectives and remedial sentence reduction).
136. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. This efficiency improvement would be a major advantage even if a separate resentencing hearing were required.
137. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that such hearings are "brief and cost "far less" than retrials);
138. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §856, at 511-512 (2004).
139. See United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1990);
140. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-1186 (2d Cir. 1981).
141. United States v. Dicus, 579 F. Supp. 2d, 1142, 1160-1161 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (citing and agreeing with earlier draft of this Article).
142. See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1107 & n.252 (2001);
143. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 116;
144. Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1214-15, 1222-23, 1236-37 (2004).
145. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. Starr, supra note 6, at 717 (discussing the Rwanda Tribunal's turn to sentence reduction as a pollitically acceptable alternate remedy when release posed risk of catastrophic political backlash).
147. See infra section IVC (discussing role of proportionality in public acceptance of remedies).
148. Dicus, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-1161
149. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 292 (1983) (discussing deterrence of crime).
151. E.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 n.12 (1968);
152. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 380 & n.112 (1997) (citing studies).
153. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 655, 660 (2006).
154. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1183 (2d Cir. 1981);
155. Alschuler, supra note 17, at 647;
156. Cicchini, supra note 17, at 348;
157. Meares, supra note 17, at 900-01;
158. Steele, supra note 17, at 976-77;
159. see also infra section VC (discussing scholarship on harmless error review).
160. Oren Bick, writing on sentence reduction in Canada, has questioned its deterrent value, although he provides no empirical basis for his position and does not focus on prosecutors, specifically. Oren Bick, Remedial Sentence Reduction, 51 CRIM. L.Q. 199, 221 (2006).
161. See Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 59;
162. Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 942, 966-67 (1997);
163. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 46 n.158 (1997).
164. See Gershman, supra note 52, at 430;
165. Alicia M. Hilton, Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v. Michigan; Preventing and Remedying Police Misconduct, 53 VILL. REV. 47, 80 (2008) (discussing studies).
166. See Gershman, supra note 52 at 430. ("That prosecutors actually do assess the risks and benefits associated with misconduct is an intuitively, anecdotally, and empirically well-founded conclusion."). Some misconduct may, however, be motivated by non-conviction-related reasons, including idiosyncratic factors like personal animus toward defense counsel.
167. E.g., Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149, 155 (2001);
168. Easterbrook, supra note 77, at 295-96;
169. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 63 (1971);
170. Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 928 n.123 (2005).
171. 86.' See Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize?: An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 260-61, 286 (2000) (finding evidence suggesting prosecutors maximize both social welfare and career advancement);
172. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 330 (2002). Prosecutors no doubt also have personal interests that may diverge from the public interest in deterrence,
173. see, e.g.. Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 73 (2007), but, as discussed below, those interests also favor longer sentences.
174. See Richman, supra note 82, at 966.
175. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
176. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
177. Easterbrook, supra note 77, at 295-296
178. Landes, supra note 85, at 63;
179. accord Smith, supra note 85, at 928 n.123.
180. If McGruff's understanding of deterrence theory is sophisticated, the longer the base sentence is, the longer a sentence reduction will be required to deter him. Economist-prosecutor McGruff would understand that each added year in a criminal sentence has a decreasing marginal deterrent effect on crime because criminals (like other people) discount harms that await them far into the future. See Easterbrook, supra note 77, at 295.
181. Scholars have generally so assumed. E.g., Stuntz, supra note 82, at 46 n.159. In addition, one survey of federal prosecutors found a small but "growing" minority of so-called "deadwood" career prosecutors who "seek the easiest types of cases." Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States Attorneys ' Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 285-287 (2002).
182. See Miller, supra note 71, at 1258.
183. To be sure, some defendants no doubt enter plea agreements without much information about the specific prosecutor they face, which weakens Sleepy's incentive to pursue a reputation for winning high sentences at trial. Still, at least some defendants (or their counsel, more likely) would probably have such information, so Sleepy should have at least some incentive toward high sentences. Moreover, if Sleepy thought her reputation did not affect her ability to get pleas, she would not particularly care about winning either and thus would not have any incentive to commit deliberate misconduct in the first place (though her laziness might make her susceptible to negligence).
184. Kg., JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 174 (1978);
185. Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 49, 60;
186. Lochner, supra note 93, at 277.
187. Much of the literature on prosecutors has focused on federal prosecutors and has assumed that most are transient like Moneybags. Lochner, supra note 93, at 273-74 (reviewing literature). This may no longer be accurate-Lochner's study found that Hotshot-like careerists have recently come to dominate U.S. Attorney's offices. See id at 281-284 In any event, Hotshot and Moneybags are likely to have similar reasons to avoid sentence reductions.
188. See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627, 627-28, 648 (2005) (finding that high private-sector salaries encourage prosecutors to try high-profile cases to impress potential employers).
189. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 206;
190. Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1505 (1999) ("Future employers will evaluate a prosecutor by his success in litigation-").
191. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.crimelynx.com/ashchargememo.html (requiring prosecutors "to Pursue the Most Serious, Readily Provable Offense," measuring seriousness by length of sentence, and stating that the "use of statutory enhancements is strongly encouraged");
192. Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/dag-jan- 28-comey-memo-on-booker.pdf (requiring federal prosecutors to oppose every below-Guidelines sentence);
193. RICHARD THORNBURGH, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PLEA POLICY FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1989),
194. reprinted in 6 FED. SENT'G REP. 347 (1994) (similar);
195. Miller, supra note 71, at 1255 (observing that this "basic policy" dates back to 1980). These policies contain loopholes that permit some discretion,
196. see id. at 1257, but still clearly reflect a general institutional preference for high sentences.
197. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 206 (noting that prosecutors' "competence ... tends to be measured in terms of 'wins,' i.e., 'heavy' convictions and sentences");
198. Meares, supra note 17, at 885 (noting that "effectiveness can be measured ... by a combination of the prosecutor's conviction rate and the severity of sentences");
199. NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR PROSECUTORS: FINDINGS FROM THE APPLICATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN Two PROSECUTORS' OFFICES 14 (2007), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/performance-measures-findings-07.pdf (listing "sentence length" among eight "core performance measures").
200. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045 (1972);
201. Richman, supra note 82, at 968.
202. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 215-16 (noting mat reputation for overzealousness can harm prosecutors' careers);
203. Meares, supra note 17, at 918 & n.52 (noting that prosecutors care greatly about impressing colleagues and seek to "avoid embarrassing losses");
204. Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 57-58 (1967) (stating mat prosecutors seek "a reputation for utter credibility").
205. See Alshuler, supra note 17, at 647 (noting that "[w]hen the behavior of an assistant district attorney leads to a reversal, his superiors know about it"). Even Sleepys might be motivated to avoid this embarrassment because judicially punished misconduct might provide the rare "good cause" needed to fire under-performing civil servants.
206. See Lochner, supra note 93, at 283-284
207. Fisher, supra note 46, at 213;
208. accord United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1990);
209. Allen, supra note 24, at 334. One former federal prosecutor told me that the actual inclusion of the word "misconduct" in an opinion would embarrass many prosecutors even absent a concrete remedy and that courts vary in their willingness to use this loaded term. Email from Mary Fan, Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, to author (Aug. 18, 2008) (on file with author). To avoid remedial deterrence, my proposal would not require courts to use that term; sentence reduction would be triggered by the finding of a rights violation caused by the prosecutor's actions, not by any "magic word." In addition, although most prosecutors might well be ashamed by a misconduct finding standing alone, the "bad actors" who commit most misconduct may be likelier to disregard such findings absent some remedy. Misconduct "is frequently committed by repeat prosecutorial offenders," Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 68, suggesting that some prosecutors are not significantly discouraged by a first finding of misconduct, much less removed from their jobs as a result.
210. See Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 63 (noting loose day-to-day supervision of line prosecutors).
211. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 198 (discussing "conviction psychology");
212. Meares, supra note 17, at 918 (describing the "desire to win" as "a primary characteristic of existing prosecutorial culture");
213. Richman, supra note 82, at 967-968
214. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 206, 208 (arguing that the adversary system drives prosecutors toward "maximizing convictions and punishments");
215. Posner, supra note 99, at 1505 (arguing that "the desire to win, weighted by the stakes in the case (roughly, the sentence if the defendant is convicted), is the most important argument in the prosecutorial utility function").
216. Even if Champ turned over the appeal to a different prosecutor, loss on appeal would hurt his "bottom line." See Mèares, supra note 17, at 900.
217. See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 334, 335 (2002) (noting that over 95% of chief prosecutors at the state and local level are elected).
218. E.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1558 (1981).
219. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone 's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 602-03 (2005) (arguing that DAs are "fixated" on crime rate reports);
220. Thompson, supra note 86, at 331.
221. See, e.g., Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, A Critique of Roscoe Pound's Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.- The Missing Discussion of Criminal Law, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 969, 971-72 (2007) (citing the "political reward for ... long sentences");
222. Gordon & Huber, supra note 110, at 335 n.1 (finding in survey that 77% wanted harsher sentences). Even unelected prosecutors may face political pressure to increase sentences.
223. See SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 144-145 (1977) (discussing congressional oversight of DOJ antitrust prosecution).
224. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 205;
225. Gordon & Huber, supra note 110, at 350 (arguing that "voters will always reward prosecutors for obtaining convictions");
226. Richman, supra note 82, at 967.
227. See Gordon & Huber, supra note 110, at 337 (noting that district attorney candidates emphasize sentences in addition to conviction rates).
228. Id... at 335 & n.2 (noting that misconduct sometimes produces "well-publicized scandals");
229. see also Fisher, supra note 46, at 207 ("Unless it results in reversal of the conviction, or public scandal, the prosecutor's choice to act 'overzealously' can be cost-free." (emphasis added)).
230. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1938);
231. see Fisher, supra note 46, at 216 (citing professional standards).
232. Even if office policy nominally constrains her charging, in practice she probably has some discretion. See Miller, supra note 71, at 1257;
233. Richman, supra note 16, at 2068-2069
234. E.g., Bowman & Heise, supra note 71, at 1119-1124
235. Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 CoLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011 n.3 (2005);
236. see also Bowman & Heise, supra note 71, at 1116-1118 (noting prosecutors' discretion to seek "substantial assistance" departures).
237. Alschuler, supra note 17, at 647.
238. See Richman, supra note 16, at 2056, 2074;
239. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion 17 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract-Id=1099064 (noting that Assistant U.S. Attorneys' charging and plea bargaining practices vary widely both between and within districts).
240. E.g., Glaeser et al., supra note 86, at 260-261, 268.
241. See Meares, supra note 17, at 918;
242. Leonard R. Mellon et al., The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 79 (1981).
243. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 46, at 206-207
244. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 85, at 896, 928.
245. See, e.g., Troy Anderson, D.A., Sheriff Says Inmates Will Soon Serve Longer Terms, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 9, 2006, at N6;
246. Bob Bernick Jr., No More 5-to-Life Sentences for Killers in Utah?, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Utah), Sept. 25, 2005;
247. Matthew Franck, Prosecutors Criticize Child-Sex Bill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 2006, at D4;
248. Andy Furillo, Revisions to Three-Strikes Law Sought, EAST COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Jan. 18, 2006, at A11;
249. Stacey Range, Embezzlers May Face Tougher Penalties Under Mich. Proposal, LANSING ST. J. (Mich.), Sept. 25, 2006, at 1A;
250. Jonathan Saltzman, Push Is On to Keep Sex Criminals Locked Up, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2005, at Al.
251. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 71, at 1215.
252. See id at 1253 (arguing that prosecutors like the federal sentencing guidelines because they have greatly increased "prosecutorial control... over the plea/trial differential").
253. Smith, supra note 85, at 922-925
254. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
255. Gordon & Huber, supra note 110, at 337.
256. Fisher, supra note 46, at 254-55;
257. see supra notes 107,124 and accompanying text.
258. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 245-46 & n.197;
259. Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking By Prosecutors: The Use of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE 335, 335 (1990).
260. Bowman & Heise, supra note 71, at 1049-50, 1131-1133
261. Fisher, supra note 46, at 198-200 & nn.2-8, 15-16 (collecting sources);
262. see Dunahoe, supra note 17, at 68 (noting that "deliberate, flagrant, pervasive, and prejudicial prosecutorial abuse ... is frequently committed by repeat prosecutorial offenders").
263. Conviction rates are probably the most basic measurement of prosecutorial performance. See, e.g., Hylton & Khanna, supra note 86, at 85 (noting that prosecutors "are rewarded when conviction rates are high");
264. Thompson, supra note 86, at 331.
265. See Cicchini, supra note 17, at 336 (arguing that retrials greatly reduce the deterrent effect of reversal). Where permitted, reversals may result in plea bargaining.
266. See Posner, supra note 40, at 644. Sentence reduction could be worse than reversal for me prosecutor if its magnitude exceeds the concessions needed to get the defendant to take a plea.
267. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 112, at 608.
268. This problem is not unique to sentence reduction; similar uncertainty plagues all deterrent remedies in constitutional law. Meltzer, supra note 57, at 290-91;
269. see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 427-428 (1999).
270. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,163 (1803).
271. Davis v. Bd. of Seh. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1979);
272. see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976);
273. Meltzer, supra note 57, at 249.
274. E.g., Jules Coleman, The Costs of the Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 337, 348-54 (2005) (describing and critiquing this shift away from corrective justice).
275. E.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 16 (3d ed. 2002).
276. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23;
277. ALBERT DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 199 (10th ed. 1959).
278. See Starr, supra note 6, at 698-705.
279. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1765, 1778, 1784 (1991).
280. For instance, remedies in institutional reform litigation involve complicated policy choices. See Chayes, supra note 142, at 1296-1302;
281. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1979);
282. see also DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 9-10, 12 (2006) (arguing that bom private and public law remedies involve such discretionary choices);
283. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 53, 71-73 (arguing that discretion and compromise pervade common law remedial decisionmaking).
284. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 147, at 1786 (observing that notwimstanding right-remedy gaps, "[e]ffective remedies have always been available for most violations of legal rights").
285. For instance, the Supreme Court has usually sought to justify the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in deterrence terms alone. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984);
286. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,347 (1974).
287. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973). For a discussion of This holding, see infra section VA.
288. Meltzer, supra note 57, at 268-69 (citing such critics but disagreeing with them).
289. Id...
290. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, the Unbearable Lightness of Batson.- Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 318-19 (2007);
291. Joy, supra note 17, at 428-29;
292. Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 317-18 (2008);
293. Williams, supra note 62, at 1200.
294. E.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLAL. REV. 1659, 1666 (1992).
295. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2000).
296. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 381 (2000);
297. see also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 726 (1998).
298. Pildes, supra note 157, at 755.
299. Andrew E. Tasulitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 Miss. L.J. 483, 564 (2006);
300. see Cicchini, supra note 17, at 343-44.
301. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 156, at 1565-67.
302. E.g., Brent T. White, Say You're Sorry, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1278 (2006).
303. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 156, at 1529;
304. see, e.g., Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1048 (2002).
305. Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitutional DecisionMaking, 77 Miss. L.J. 265, 286 (2007).
306. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026-27 (1996) (discussing arguments of Bernard Williams).
307. McAdams, supra note 157, at 340;
308. Pildes, supra note 157, at 755;
309. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 454-57 (1997);
310. Sunstein, supra note 164, at 2025-27 (distinguishing these two approaches to expressive law).
311. See McAdams, supra note 157, 371-73 (arguing that economists should make "the expressive consequences of law a standard component of their models").
312. See Friedman, supra note 163, at 286 (arguing that restoring "the status quo ante ... recognizes the expressive injury and reaffirms" the proper relationship between the parties).
313. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 60-61 (1993) (noting, however, that there is "no canonical conception of corrective justice").
314. Anderson & Plides, supra note 156, at 1529;
315. see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (holding that through nominal damages awards, "the law recognizes the importance" of those rights to society).
316. But see White, supra note 161, at 1278-79 (arguing that limiting relief to nominal damages suggests "that the municipality's actions weren't all that serious").
317. Friedman, supra note 163, at 289;
318. see also Hampton, supra note 155, at 1686-87.
319. Joel Feinberg, the Expressive Function of Punishment, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 87, 90 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994).
320. Robinson & Darley, supra note 165, at 470, 472;
321. see also Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 800-06 (1997).
322. See Steiker, supra note 172, at 807 (discussing how punishment "reach[es] inside the self').
323. E.g., United States v. Mendoza, 522 F.3d 482, 495 (5th Cir. 2008);
324. United States v. Helmandollar, 852 F.2d 498, 502 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988);
325. United States v. Módica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981).
326. See Steiker, supra note 172, at 803-04 (describing "blaming" as the core purpose of punishment).
327. See supra section III.B.
328. See Hampton, supra note 155, at 1663 (explaining that corrective justice is concerned with harms whlie retributive justice is concerned with "wrongful actions").
329. E.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 83 (2007).
330. E.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 165, at 457.
331. See supra section III.B.5.
332. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43,68 (1988).
333. Robinson & Darley, supra note 165, at 457-58.
334. Cf. White, supra note 161, at 1279-80 (arguing that perceived excessive size of punitive damage verdicts undermines their expressive message).
335. I use this word in its broader, metaphorical sense, rather than to refer literally to market trading. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1987) (discussing different meanings of the term).
336. See, e.g.. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-14 (2000) (finding that when day care centers instituted fines for late pickup of children, late pickups increased, perhaps due to reduced stigma);
337. Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 325-26 (2006) (discussing similar criticism of tradable pollution permits).
338. But see Lior Jacob Strabilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1262-64 (2000) (finding that pricing access to carpool lanes strengthened the pro-carpoofing social norm).
339. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).
340. See, e.g., Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 270-82 (2006) (discussing tort damages);
341. Levinson, supra note 61, at 410 (discussing constitutional damages);
342. Radin, supra note 168, at 69-75 (discussing tort damages).
343. See Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2005);
344. Friedman, supra note 163, at 288.
345. Cf. Levinson, supra note 61, at 417 (arguing that the exclusionary rule "imposes on police [costs]... in the same currency as the benefits the police capture").
346. See id.
347. See White, supra note 161, at 1279.
348. See Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1990 (arguing that "norms help us to know whemer to regard legal rules and sanctions as mere prices");
349. Radin, supra note 168, at 56, 85 (arguing that compensation need not be understood as commodification).
350. See also Allan Manson, Charter Violations in Mitigation of Sentence, 41 CRIM. REP. (4th) 318, 323 (1995) (Can.) (arguing, in Canadian context, that sentencing is an effective opportunity to express the value of constitutional rights because it is the aspect of the criminal process that "is most readily and widely communicated to members of the community").
351. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 670-80 (1981).
352. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 77.
353. See Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (and Limits) of Neuroeconomics, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2006) (suggesting that "in practice when things have no price, we tend to treat them not as priceless but as worthless"). Gneezy and Rustichini's day care study does suggest that leaving violations unpunished might be better than imposing fines in terms of social stigma.
354. See supra note 185. But that study involved a small fine-about $2.72, far less than other pubulicly assessed fines in Israel.
355. See id at 4-5. The upshot may simply be that trivial "prices" are worse than nothing-they imply that the norm is not serious.
356. Similar translation problems infect jury awards of punitive damages, see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PUNTITVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 31, 34-36, 40-41 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (finding that mock juries are consistent in assessing wrongfulness, but wildly inconsistent in attaching dollar figures), and there is no reason to assume judges are immune from such difficulties,
357. see W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in PUNTITVE DAMAGES, supra at 186, 206.
358. Indeed, traditional discretionary sentencing resulted in wide disparities, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988), suggesting difficulty translating crime wrongfulness into sentence-years.
359. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 359-62 (1991) (citing studies of pre-Guidelines sentencing disparity).
360. See Breyer, supra note 197, at 4 (discussing guidelines' objectives).
361. See Kent Roach, Section 24(1) of the Charter: Strategy and Structure, 29 CRIM. L.Q. 222, 262-63 (1987) (making this argument against sentence reduction in the Canadian context).
362. Such concerns have been cited in at least two Canadian decisions. See R. v. Carpenter, [2002] 2002 BCCA 301, ¶¶ 26-27 (Can.);
363. R. v. Glykis, [1995] 24 O.R.3d 803, ¶¶ 21, 26 (Can.).
364. In a related piece, I argue specifically that sentence reduction is consistent wim objectives federal courts must consider under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2). See Starr, supra note 8, at 31-33.
365. Bick, supra note 81, at 224-25. Bick asserts that courts will only be able to draw this distinction in situations where sentence reduction truly "corrects" a hardship to the defendant, id, but it is hard to see why such clarification would be impossible even in cases in which sentence reductions exceed what is correctively justified in order to serve expressive or deterrent purposes.
366. See id at 219-22.
367. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §3585(b) (2006);
368. see also Starr, supra note 8, at 35 n.45 (discussing cases suggesting that retributive justice allows sentence offsets for other kinds of state-imposed harms).
369. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
370. Bick, supra note 81, at 225.
371. See, e.g., Ilyana Kuziemko, Going Off Parole: How the Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release Affects the Social Cost of Crime 29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13380, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3380.pdf.
372. See Bick, supra note 81, at 225.
373. See Hannah T.S. Long, The "Inequability" of Incarceration, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 321, 333 (1998) ("[A]ctual sentencing patterns are frequendy inconsistent with the requirements of incapacitation. In fact, sentence length for violent offenders is inversely related to the likelihood of recidivism.").
374. E.g., Michael Edmund O'Neill & Linda Drazga Maxfield, Judicial Perspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Goals of Sentencing: Debunking the Myths, 56 ALA. L. REV. 85, 108 (2004).
375. See, e.g., Deji Olukotun, Note, Harm Reduction Statutes and Immigrants in California: Removal of the Shadow-Class, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 429, 437 (2005) (explaining different immigration consequences of pre- and post-conviction diversion);
376. David Louis Raybin, Expungement of Arrest Records: Erasing the Past, TENN. B.J., Mar. 2008, at 22, 23-25, (explaining that Tennessee courts do not have the power to expunge convictions once entered).
377. E.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 82, 107-08 (1990);
378. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict & Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 214-15 (2007);
379. Larry Heuer et al., the Role of Societal Benefits and Fairness Concerns Among Decision Makers and Decision Recipients, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 573, 574 (2007) (noting that these findings are so consistent across legal, organizational, and polutical settings that they are among '"the most robust findings in the justice literature'"
380. (quoting Joel Brockner et al., Cultural and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Distance on Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMTL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 301 (2001)));
381. David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 380 (2002);
382. Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed, and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 457, 479 (2007) (observing that "values shape rule adherence, while procedural justice shapes values").
383. Franck, supra note 213, at 214-15;
384. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law?: The Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 664,673 (2007);
385. see Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 213, at 380.
386. Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 400 (2000) (citing studies).
387. Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163,163 (1997).
388. Id.. at 191-92.
389. TYLER, supra note 213, at 110.
390. Id... at 108.
391. Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 377-86 (2001).
392. Meares, supra note 215, at 404;
393. Paternoster et al., supra note 216, at 168;
394. Tyler et al., supra note 213, at 471-72,478.
395. Paternoster et al., supra note 216, at 169-70 (citations omitted) (reviewing Uterature).
396. Id.. at 168.
397. Id... at 167-68.
398. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1. 1 (2008).
399. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §801.57 (West 2008) (ordering reduction of all prisoners' sentences in response to overcrowding);
400. Jack Leonard & Doug Smith, Hilton Will Do More Time Than Most, Analysis Finds, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at A-1 (discussing California early release program).
401. E.g., KATE STTTH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 53 (1998);
402. Adam Lamparello, Social Psychology, Legitimacy, and the Ethical Foundations of Judgment: Importing the Procedural Justice Model to Federal Sentencing Jurisprudence, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 115, 118-19, 141-42 (2006);
403. Paul H. Robinson, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (1997).
404. Lamparello, supra note 227, at 118-19, 136, 142-43;
405. Robinson, supra note 227, at 1241.
406. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
407. Id..
408. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
409. United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
410. Id..
411. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. at 440.
412. Id... at 439.
413. Amar, supra note 30, at 649-58;
414. Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 535-36.
415. See Amar, supra note 30, at 646;
416. Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 539.
417. Amar does note that sentences should be offset "for time served [in pretrial detention] to avoid double punishment," Amar, supra note 30, at 652, but this is routine and not remedial; defendants are always credited for time served even absent any constitutional violation.
418. Id.. at 649-58;
419. Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 535;
420. Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 430 (1999).
421. See Amar, supra note 30, at 669-70, 675-76.
422. The Rwanda Tribunal often orders conditional remedies: sentence reduction upon conviction or damages upon acquittal. See, e.g., Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, 175 (Mar. 31, 2000).
423. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
424. See Amar, supra note 30, at 670.
425. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2006), provided specific time limits for each stage in a federal criminal prosecution.
426. See Andrew M. Siegel, When Prosecutors Control Criminal Court Dockets: Dispatches on History and Policy from a Land Time Forgot, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 357 n.116 (2005).
427. HERMAN, supra note 30, at 207;
428. Siegel, supra note 245, at 357 n.116.
429. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (requiring dismissal but allowing discretion as to whether it is with prejudice);
430. HERMAN, supra note 30, at 204 (discussing the effect of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers).
431. HERMAN, supra note 30, at 204.
432. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986);
433. see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (applying this rule to sex-based strikes).
434. See Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93,116-17 & nn.148-49 (1996) (discussing cases).
435. See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1455 (2009) (describing Batson as an "automatic reversal" case).
436. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
437. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-89 (1990).
438. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406, 409, 413-14 (1991);
439. see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 505 (1972) (likewise granting reversal in a case with a white defendant and no Sixth Amendment claim);
440. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 734-36 (1992).
441. Henning, supra note 47, at 788-89.
442. Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 995 (1998);
443. accord Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 193-94 (1989);
444. see also Powers, 499 U.S. at 414 (holding that the defendant should have standing to raise the jurors' rights claim because, among other reasons, he "will be a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons' rights," whereas excluded jurors rarely bring claims on their own).
445. See Covey, supra note 154, at 316;
446. Henning, supra note 47, at 717.
447. See supra note 28 and accompanying text;
448. Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 501,527-32 (reviewing cases showing overreliance on supposed neutral explanations);
449. Gershman, supra note 52, at 441 (arguing that "prosecutors are becoming increasingly adept at articulating race-neutral reasons that often appear to be pretextual, but are commonly accepted by the courts").
450. See Karlan, supra note 28, at 2022-23.
451. See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 115 ("One of the dungs I have noticed as a judge is diat even when people have been sentenced to thirty or forty years in jail, they fight desperately to get two points down on the sentencing guidelines.");
452. Posner, supra note 99, at 623 (noting that defendants will appeal even when "the expected benefits may be slight" because "the expected costs are zero"). Of course, raising arguments has costs for defense counsel's time.
453. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure, Justice, Ethics, and Zeal, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2146, 2148-49 (1998);
454. Stuntz, supra note 82, at 32, 36-37. Still, if defense counsel has a good chance of winning an argument on appeal, she would be plainly irresponsible not to raise it even if the result would only be sentence reduction and not reversal.
455. E.g., Covey, supra note 154, at 316 (arguing that Batson "symbolizes official intolerance of discrimination injury selection").
456. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
457. Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1455 (2009).
458. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438,450 & n.13 (1986) (holding that most errors may be deemed harmless on the basis of "overwhelming evidence").
459. Other kinds of constitutional errors are routinely deemed harmless even though doing so requires considerable counterfactual speculation. For instance, the Supreme Court has approved harmless error review in cases in which jury instructions have omitted or misstated one of the elements of the crime. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 9-11 (compiling cases). It is not evident that substitution of one or two jurors is more of a "structural" error than failure to have any jurors adjudicate one of the elements.
460. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1195 (1995).
461. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 17, at 659;
462. Charles F. Campbell, Jr., An Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Error and Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 511 (1990);
463. Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is Locked-Habeas Corpus and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115, 131-32 (1994);
464. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 437-38 (1980);
465. Sam Kamm, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 59 (2002).
466. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 162 (1991).
467. Id.. at 170.
468. Id...;
469. see also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 86-91 (1988).
470. Edwards, supra note 266, at 1195.
471. Friedman, supra note 163, at 289.
472. Edwards, supra note 266, at 1182.
473. John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 405 (1999);
474. accord Jeffrey O. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court's Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 KAN. U. L. REV. 309, 310-11 (2002);
475. Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 61 (1976);
476. Goldberg, supra note 267, at 435-36;
477. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2004).
478. E.g., Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944);
479. see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 851-58, 891-95, 935-36 (2005) (suggesting that the avoidance principle should be applicable to harmless error cases).
480. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2 (1993);
481. see United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lynch, Howard, JJ., opinion of the court in part, concurring in part) (noting that Lockhart means the avoidance canon does not apply to harmless error cases);
482. In re Fashina, 486 F.3d 1300,1303 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same);
483. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., the Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 660 n.90 (2006).
484. Healy, supra note 275, at 893;
485. see, e.g., United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (l0th Cir. 1996) (ignoring Lockhart despite a dissent relying on it).
486. See Goldberg, supra note 267, at 441-42;
487. Ogletree, supra note 268, at 167;
488. James Edward . Wicht III, There is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73 (1997).
489. Allen, supra note 24, at 332 n.99;
490. Stuart P. Green, The Challenge of Harmless Error, 59 LA. L. REV. 1101, 1102-03(1999).
491. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 147, at 1799-1800;
492. accord Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Applications of Criminal Laws, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 766 (2007).
493. See, e.g., ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 17-51 (1970);
494. Cooper, supra note 274, at 312-13;
495. Edwards, supra note 266, at 1171;
496. Field, supra note 274, at 16;
497. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 270, at 91-92.
498. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 267, at 67-71 (showing that pro-death penalty justices on the California Supreme Court were vasdy more likely than anti-death-penalty justices to deem constitutional errors in capital cases harmless).
499. See Henning, supra note 47, at 820;
500. supra Part I (discussing the costs of retrials).
501. For a more thorough discussion of these options at the federal level, see Starr, supra note 8.
502. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
503. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
504. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
505. Id.. at 301;
506. see also id. at 333 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
507. For simplicity, I assume that federal remedial legislation would cover federal courts while state legislation would cover state courts. However, Congress could in principle reach state court cases under its au'diority to specify remedies for states' violations of the Fourteenm Amendment. Cf. Craig Bradley, the Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution: A Response, 47 J. LEG. ED. 129, 130 (1997) (arguing that "Congress has the power, under section 5 of the Fourteendi Amendment, to promulgate a federal code of criminal procedure" applicable to state courts). States could be expected to challenge such legislation; the Supreme Court has permitted prophylactic Section 5 remedies that exceed constitutional requirements, but only if they are "congruent and proportional" to underlying constitutional violations.
508. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997).
509. Sentence reduction legislation would be most likely to satisfy this standard if it were triggered only by clearly unconstitutional misconduct, see id at 519, and if the legislature made findings concerning a pattern of such misconduct in state courts,
510. see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 369, 370-72 (2001).
511. See Muller, supra note 250, at 93 nn.148-49 (1996) (stating that the Court, as of 1996, had never actually held that automatic reversal was required).
512. In its recent decision in Rivera v. Illinois, which was not a Batson case, the Court did describe Batson as having "held that the unlawful exclusion of jurors based on race requires reversal." 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1455 (2009).
513. Stuntz, supra note 82, at 53 n. 178.
514. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
515. Id...;
516. see John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 794 (2005) (noting that the "exact scope of Congress's power to alter remedies ... remains doctrinally unclear").
517. When trial judges identify racially aiscriminatory strikes, they can simply refuse to allow them. That remedy would not change under my proposal, although sentence reduction could be added as an additional deterrent remedy.
518. Stuntz, supra note 82, at 53 n. 178.
519. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-10 (1989) (holding that new constitutional holdings generally do not apply retroactively, via collateral attack, to cases in which convictions have become final).
520. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at.
521. See Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 309 (2003);
522. Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191,1193 (1978).
523. E.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (holding that the Supreme Court has no supervisory power to displace me federal harmless error statute); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-48 (1959).
524. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967);
525. Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 57 n.106.
526. See, e.g., CAL. CONST, art. VI §13; VA. CODE. ANN. §8.01-678 (2007); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
527. Although the question whether a federal constitutional error is harmless is itself a federal question, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21, states apparendy may adopt remedies for federal rights violations that federal courts would not grant in harmless error cases. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, die Supreme Court suggested that a state court could adopt an automatic reversal rule as a "state prophylactic rule designed to insure protection for a federal constitutional right," so long as it made clear that the remedial rule was an "adequate and independent state ground" rather than being derived from the federal Constitution. 475 U.S. 673, 678 n.3 (1986); see also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 91 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("A State, of course, may apply a more stringent state harmless error rule than Chapman would require."); cf. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2008) (recognizing "the audiority of the States to provide [post-conviction] remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas").
528. United States v. Dicus, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (citing United States v. Mosley, 505 F.3d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-263 (1971))).
529. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (observing that me Court has continued to apply the automatic reversal rule to some constitutional errors notwithstanding the contrary text of Rule 52(a) of me Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
530. The Court has adopted such prophylactic remedial rules in other contexts-notably, die Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. See, e.g.. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,906-907 (1984).
531. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993).
532. Fry v. Piller, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (2007).
533. E.g., Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2003); Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 79 (3d Cir. 2002); Janečka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 329 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Harbin, 250 F.3d 532, 544-545 (7th Cir. 2001) (referring to the footnote-nine exception in a direct appeal).
534. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986).
535. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638 n.9.
536. Compare R. v. Carpenter, [2002] 2002 BCCA 301, 126 (Can.), with R. v. MacPherson, [1995] 166 N.B.R.2d 81, 116 (Can.). See generally Bick, supra note 81 (discussing the controversy).
537. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 602 (2007) (holding mat "the Guidelines are only one of the factors to consider when imposing sentence"). Moreover, although federal courts are required by 28 U.S.C. §3553(a) to consider the objectives of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and respect for the law, remedial sentence reduction is generally consistent with those objectives, for reasons discussed in section IVE. See Starr, supra note 8, at 31-33 (developing these arguments).
538. See Amsterdam, supra note 30, at 535 n.81 (raising this objection in the speedy trial context); see also Caldwell & Chase, supra note 10, at 71-72 (describing this as a "legitimate concern").
539. Caldwell & Chase, supra note 10, at 72.
540. Even if the appeals court remanded the case to me trial court for resentencing, the trial court would presumably be stuck with its own base sentence and could not increase it to compensate for the reduction; such an increase would be transparently retaliatory and thus forbidden. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 (1973).
541. See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 116 (arguing that severe sentencing laws mean mat judges wiU not put a "diumb on me scale" to increase sentences).
542. E.g., Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1508-1509 (1993).
543. See supra section IU.C.
544. Relatedly, Bill Stuntz argues mat expanded procedural protections induce prosecutors to change whom they charge, dropping cases mat have likely procedural claims in favor of those mat do not. . Stuntz, supra note 82, at 4, 28. However, that argument largely pertains to police procedure-charging practices are much less likely to be affected by improved remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, given the timing of that misconduct.
545. Id.. at 7;
546. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 784 (2006);
547. accord William T. Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American Criminal Justice System, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 66-67 (1996).
548. See Stuntz, supra note 320, at 796, 802-803 (noting that legislatures sometimes expand procedural protections themselves even though they resent judicially created protections).
549. See HERMAN, supra note 30, at 205-206 (noting that "what remedy to provide had occasioned active debate in Congress because the choices-a severe remedy allowing alleged criminals to escape punishment or a remedy with few if any teeth-were not inviting").
550. Bick, supra note 81, at 230-231
551. Id.. at 230.
552. See United States v. Dicus, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1142,1160 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (arguing diat sentence reduction "provides an important incentive to defendants to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct").
553. See Anna-Rose Mathieson & Samuel R. Gross, Review for Error, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259,266 (2003) (arguing that appellate courts "focus their attention primarily on me rare cases in which they think a defendant might be innocent, and paper over procedural errors in the rest").
554. Joy, supra note 17, at 403;
555. see also Brandon Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 111-112 (arguing that recent exonerations have revealed diat many people are wrongfully convicted under our current harmless error framework).
556. See Joy, supra note 17, at 399-400 (arguing that better remedies and disincentives for prosecutorial misconduct are necessary to reduce wrongful convictions).