Discrete choices under social influence: Generic properties

Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences

Volumn 19, Issue SUPPL. 1, 2009, Pages 1441-1481

  Gordon, Mirta B ^a   Nadal, Jean Pierre ^b,c   Phan, Denis ^d   Semeshenko, Viktoriya ^e  

^a LABORATOIRE TIMC IMAG   (France)

^b ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES   (France)

^c ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

^d Paris Sorbonne University   (France)

^e UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Collective phenomena; Discrete choice; Externalities; Heterogeneous agents; Random field Ising models.; Random utility models; Social influence

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; ISING MODEL; PHASE EQUILIBRIA;

COLLECTIVE PHENOMENA; DISCRETE CHOICE; EXTERNALITIES; HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS; RANDOM FIELD ISING MODELS; RANDOM UTILITY MODEL; SOCIAL INFLUENCE;

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS;

EID: 70349318486     PISSN: 02182025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0218202509003887     Document Type: Article

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