Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

Volumn 43, Issue 10, 2009, Pages 952-965

  Barbot, Cristina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PORTO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Airport competition; Vertical collusion

Indexed keywords

AIR TRANSPORTATION;

AIRLINE COMPETITION; AIRPORT COMPETITION; DYNAMIC GAME; FULL-SERVICE AIRLINES; LOW-COST AIRLINES; MARKET SIZES; THREE-STAGE GAMES; VERTICAL COLLUSION;

AIRPORTS;

AIRLINE INDUSTRY; AIRPORT; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; INCENTIVE; MARKET SYSTEM; TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS;

EID: 69749115442     PISSN: 01912615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001     Document Type: Article

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