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Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 471-496

Vertical integration and collusive incentives: An experimental analysis

Author keywords

L1; L22; Market experiments; Merger; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords


EID: 0034421911     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00024-1     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.