Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies

Economics Letters

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 7-10

  Sen, Debapriya ^a   Stamatopoulos, Giorgos ^b  

^a RYERSON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CRETE   (Greece)

Author keywords

AR policy; Drastic innovation; k firm natural oligopoly; Outside innovator

Indexed keywords

EID: 69349101364     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.011     Document Type: Article

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