Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model

Economics Letters

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 55-62

  Wang, X Henry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Cournot duopoly; D45; Fee licensing; Royalty licensing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032220921     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00092-5     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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