Evolutionary game theoretic approach for modeling civil violence

IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 780-800

  Quek, Han Yang ^a   Tan, Kay Chen ^a   Abbass, Hussein A ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Civil violence; Evolution; Game theory; Multiagent; Social network

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL DYNAMICS; CIVIL VIOLENCE; CO-EVOLUTION; DECISION PARAMETERS; EVOLUTION; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; GOAL-ORIENTED; MULTIAGENT; MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIAL NETWORKS; TEMPORAL SIMULATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 69249210960     PISSN: 1089778X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TEVC.2009.2019826     Document Type: Article

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