Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm-supplier relationships

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 93, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 382-399

  Hennessy, Christopher A ^a   Livdan, Dmitry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Debt overhang; Implicit contracts; Leverage

Indexed keywords

EID: 68749120552     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.006     Document Type: Article

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