Game-theoretic modelling of transboundary pollution

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 287-321

  Missfeldt, Fanny ^a  

^a UNEP Collaborating Centre   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Game theory; Transboundary pollution

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; POLLUTION CONTROL; TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION; TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION;

EID: 0032781547     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00084     Document Type: Article

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