Joint criminal enterprise and its extended form: A theory of co-perpetration giving rise to principal liability, a notion of accessorial liability, or a form of partnership in crime?

Criminal Law Forum

Volumn 20, Issue 2-3, 2009, Pages 263-287

  Olasolo, Hector ^a,b  

^a International Criminal Court ^*  (Netherlands)

^b UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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EID: 68049105211     PISSN: 10468374     EISSN: 15729850     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10609-009-9098-9     Document Type: Article

References (224)

1. Duch Case (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Appeal against Closing Order indicting Kaing Guek Eav, alias 'Duch') 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)-D99-3-42 (5 December 08) paras 14-15 [hereinafter Duch Case Appeal Decision].
2. Duch Case (Co-Investigating Magistrates Closing Order against Kaing Guek Eav, alias 'Duch') 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ - D-99 (8 August 2008) Sections 20-22 [hereinafter Duch Case Closing Order].
3. Duch Case Appeal Decision (supra note 1), at para 14.
4. According to Duch Case Appeal Decision (Ibid), at para 125 and. 141, the Co-Prosecutors had not requested the Co-investigating Magistrates to investigate the material facts underlying the alleged existence of a joint criminal enterprise to set up and run the S-21 Center in order to systematically unlawfully arrest, torture and murder individuals perceived as contrary to the Kampuchea Republic regime.
5. The ECCC PTC found it unnecessary to address the questions posed to the amici curiae because of the Co-Prosecutors' lack of timely request to investigate the materials facts underlying the alleged JCE responsibility.
6. See, Duch Case Appeal Decision (Ibid), at para 142.
7. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case (Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/07 (1 October 2008) para 485 et seq [hereinafter Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges].
8. The author has undertaken such a comprehensive analysis in H. Olásolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as Principals to International Crimes (London, Hart Publishing, 2009) (in print) [hereinafter Olásolo Criminal Responsibility].
9. The Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic et al. (Appeals Chamber Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise) ICTY-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003) para 36 [hereinafter 21 May 2003 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise].
10. Duch Case (Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese and Members of the Journal of International Criminal Justice on Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine) 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02) - D99-3-24 (27 October 08) in this volume, at 5.1.2 [hereinafter Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief].
11. Those individuals who physically carry out the objective elements of the crimes have been referred to with different expressions such as 'direct perpetrators', 'principal perpetrators', 'material perpetrators', 'physical perpetrators', 'relevant physical perpetrators' or 'perpetrators behind the direct perpetrators/actors'.
12. See The Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdanin (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-99-36-A (3 April 2007) para 362 [hereinafter Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment].
13. Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 9, at 5.1.2.
14. R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 301.
15. The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 192 [hereinafter Tadic Case Appeals Judgment].
16. The Prosecutor v Milomir Stakic (Judgment) ICTY-97-24-T (31 July 2003) paras 439 et seq [hereinafter Stakic Case Trial Judgment]. See also H. Olásolo and A Pérez Cepeda, The Notion of Control of the Crime in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY: The Stakic Case, 4 International Criminal Law Review 476 (2004) [hereinafter Olásolo and Pérez Cepeda].
17. According to the material-objective approach, perpetration and participation are distinguished on the basis of the level and intensity of the contribution to the execution of the objective elements of the crime. Perpetration requires that the contribution be essential for the completion of the crime in the sense that without it the crime would not have been committed. Those who support this approach justify it by the higher danger emanating from principals to the crime in comparison to accessories due to the different level and intensity of their respective contributions to the commission of the crime. See for all C. Roxin, Autoria y Dominio del Hecho en Derecho Penal (6th edn, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1998), p. 58 [hereinafter Roxin Autoria];
18. A. Gimbernat Ordeig, Autor y Cómplice en Derecho Penal (Madrid, Universidad de Madrid, 1966), pp. 115-117 [hereinafter Gimbernat Ordeig];
19. F. Muñoz Conde and M. Garcia Aran, Derecho Penal: Parte General (Derecho Penal: Parte General (5th edn, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2002), pp. 448-449; and
20. J.M. Zugaldia Espinar (ed), Derecho Penal: Parte General (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2002), pp. 734-735 [hereinafter Zugaldia Espinar].
21. See also H. Olásolo, Reflections on the Treatment of the Notions of Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Stakic Appeal Judgement, 7 International Criminal Law Review 143 (2007).
22. Lubanga Case (Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 Jan 2007) para 320 [hereinafter Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges]; and Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at para 485.
23. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (Ibid), at para 484.
24. According to the formal-objective approach, perpetrators or principals to the crime are only those persons who carry out one or more objective elements of the crime, whereas participants or accessories to the crime are those others who contribute in any other way to the commission of the crime. The subjective approach looks at the distinction between perpetration and participation in the personal attitude vis-à-vis the crime of each person involved in its commission. As a result, regardless of the nature and scope of the contribution to the commission of the crime, principals to the crime are only those who make their contribution with the intent to have the crime as their own deed. Those persons who contribute to the commission of the crime with the intent not to have the crime as their own deed and subordinating their will to that of the perpetrator(s) are to be considered accessories to the crime. See E. Mezger, Tratado de Derecho Penal, Vol II (Madrid, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1957), pp. 339-340;
25. Roxin Autoria, supra note 15, at 71; Gimbernat Ordeig, supra note 15, at 19-22 and 42-44;
26. Zugaldia Espinar, supra note 15, at 732-734; P. Gillies, Criminal Law (4th ed, North Ryde, LBC Information Services, 1997), pp. 157-158 [hereinafter Gillies];
27. J.C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law (11th ed, London, Butterworths, 2005), pp. 166-168 [hereinafter Smith & Hogan].
28. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges, supra note 16, at para 332; and Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges, supra note 6, at para 488.
29. See also supra note 15.
30. One could even imagine an additional scenario in which this fourth manifestation of the notion of control over the crime could be applicable. This would take place when not all co-perpetrators control one organization (or a part thereof). In this scenario, those co-perpetrators who do not control any organization would co-ordinate the implementation of the common criminal plan by those other co-perpetrators who use their organisations to have the crimes committed.
31. This is the factual situation in the German Border case, where the East Germany National Defence Council, which was the organ responsible for defence and security matters in East Germany, was comprised of several members who jointly issued those decisions in execution of which crimes were committed at the border between East and West Germany. Nevertheless, the German Federal Supreme Court failed to address the horizontal relationship between the members of the Council, and only applied the notion of indirect perpetration. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen 40, p. 218.
32. This is the factual scenario in the Katanga and Ngudjolo and Bemba cases before the ICC, and in the Stakic case before the ICTY. See Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at paras 540-582;
33. and Bemba Case (Pre-Trial Chamber III Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08-14-TEn (10 June 2008) paras 69-84.
34. See also Stakic Case Trial Judgment (supra note 14), at paras 738-744, 774, 818, 822 and 826. In this last case, ICTY Trial Chamber II used the expression 'co-perpetratorship' to refer to the combined application of the notions of indirect perpetration in its variant of Organised Structure of Power and co-perpetration based on joint control. See the explanation by Olásolo and Pérez Cepeda, supra note 14, at paras 512-514.
35. See infra note 26. On the importance of the notion of Joint Criminal Enterprise, see N. Piacente, Importance of the JCE Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 448 (2004);
36. Osiel, The Banality of the Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity, 105 Columbia Law Review 1783 (2005).
37. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment, supra note 13, at para 227.
38. See also The Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-97-25-A (17 Sep 2003) para 31 [hereinafter Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment];
39. The Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-98-32-A (25 Feb 2004) para 100 [hereinafter Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment];
40. The Prosecutor v Kvocka et al. (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-98-30/1-A (28 Feb 2005) para 96 [hereinafter Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment];
41. The Prosecutor v Stakic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-97-24-A (22 Mar 2006) para 64 [hereinafter Stakic Case Appeals Judgment];
42. The Prosecutor v Krqjisnik (Judgment) ICTY-00-39-T (27 Sep 2006) para 883 [hereinafter Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment];
43. Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 10) para 364; and
44. The Prosecutor v Milan Martic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-95-11-A (8 Oct 2008) para 82 [hereinafter Martic Case Appeals Judgment].
45. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 228;
46. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at paras 32-33;
47. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 1.0.1;
48. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at paras 82, 83, 89;
49. Stakic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 65;
50. Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 1.0), at para 365;
51. The Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic et al. (Judgment) ICTY-95-9-T (17 Oct 2003) para 1.58 [hereinafter Simic Case Trial Judgment]; and
52. Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (Ibid) at paras 879, 883.
53. See Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid) at paras 227, 229.
54. The Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at paras 97-98, 104,
55. rejected the Kvocka Case Trial Judgment's conclusion that the contribution to the implementation of the common criminal plan must be 'significant' or 'substantial'. The Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 100;
56. The Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdanin (Judgment) ICTY99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 263 [Brdanin Case Trial Judgment]; and
57. the Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (Ibid), at para 883,
58. took the same approach that the Kvocka Case Appeals Judgement. The Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment referred again to the 'significant contribution' requirement. Nevertheless, such a reference was accompanied by a quote from paragraph 97 of the Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment. As a result, the author considers that (i) the conclusion of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Brdanin case is an evidentiary one, according to which, when the intent of the defendant is to be inferred from his level of contribution, this must be 'significant'; and (ii) that the requisite level of contribution in the implementation of the common criminal plan remains, as a matter of law, fairly low. This has not been altered by the reference to the Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment made in the recent Martic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 84.
59. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 228;
60. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 84;
61. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 82;
62. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 97;
63. Stakic Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 24), at para 65;
64. Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 10) at para 365;
65. Simic Case Trial Judgment (Ibid), at para 157; Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (Ibid), at para 79;
66. See also A. Bogdan, Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Execution of a "Joint Criminal Enterprise" in the Jurisprudence of the Ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 International Criminal Law Review 63-120, 82 (2006).
67. See supra note 26. Concurring K Gustafson, The Requirements of an "Express Agreement" for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 141 (2007). However, A.M. Danner and J.S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 California Law Review 150-151 (2005) emphasize the need for the interpretation of the notion of joint criminal enterprise as requiring a significant level of contribution to the implementation of the common criminal plan. Likewise, J.D. Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 89 (2007) [hereinafter Ohlin] proposes to require a 'substantial and indispensable contribution' before criminal liability is invoked for participation in a joint criminal enterprise under art. 25 (3)(d) RS.
68. This has been made particularly clear in the context of the distinction between the notions of joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting.
69. See Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 13), at para 229;
70. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 102;
71. May 2003 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise (supra note 8), at para 20; and
72. Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (supra note 24), at para 885.
73. May 21 2003 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise (Ibid), at para 20.
74. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 13), at para 228;
75. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 24), at paras 93-94;
76. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 24), at para 82; and
77. Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 10), at para 365.
78. See also E. van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 186 (2007) [hereinafter van Sliedregt].
79. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 228;
80. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 24), at para 101; and
81. The Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 33 [hereinafter Blaskic Case Appeals Judgment].
82. See also H. van der Wilt, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Possibilities and Limitations, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 96 (2007) [hereinafter van der Wilt]; and van Sliedregt (Ibid), at 186.
83. Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9), at 5.2.1.
84. See also G. Werle, Tratado de Derecho Penal Internacional (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2005), p. 211, n 636 [hereinafter Werle]; and
85. K Ambos, La Parte General del Derecho Penal Internacional: Bases para una Elaboración Dogmática (Uruguay, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2005), p. 75 [hereinafter Ambos].
86. Art 11(2) of Allied Control Council Law No. 10.
87. Werle, supra note 33, at 211, n 636; and
88. Ambos, supra note 33, at 75.
89. Gillies, supra note 18, at 173; and Smith and Hogan, supra note 18, at 169.
90. See also K. Hamdorf, The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime: A Comparison of German and English Law, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 208 (2007), at 221-223; and
91. van Sliedregt, supra note 31, at 197.
92. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 13), at para 220.
93. Ibid, at para 220.
94. Ibid, at para 192.
95. van Sliedregt, supra note 31, at 189.
96. The conclusions on the foundation of the notion of joint criminal enterprise reached under 5.2.2 of the Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9) appear to also support this interpretation. Indeed, even if the notion of joint criminal enterprise is understood as a general theory of partnership in crime, one has problems to understand how its existence is supported by notions as diverse as: (i) the doctrine of 'joint unlawful enterprise' and 'joint enterprise liability';
97. the doctrines on conspiracy and complicity in the United States;
98. the notions of criminal association and complicity in countries such as France, Italy, Korea, Switzerland and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and
99. the notions of co-perpetration and complicity in countries such as Belgium and Germany.
100. May 21 2003 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise (supra note 8), at paras 20, 31.
101. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at paras 30, 73.
102. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at paras 95, 102.
103. Blaskic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 32), at para 33.
104. The Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-98-33-A (19 April 2004) paras 134, 137, 266-269.
105. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 79.
106. Implicitly in Prosecutor v Simic et al. (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-95-9-A (28 November 2006) para 243, n 265.
107. Implicitly in the Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 10), at paras 431, 434, 444-450.
108. The Prosecutor v Gerard Ntakirutimana and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR-96-10-A (13 December 2004) para 462.
109. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v The Prosecutor (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR-2001-64-A (7 July 2006) para 158.
110. May 21 2003 ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision on Joint Criminal Enterprise (supra note 8), at para 20.
111. Ibid.
112. See supra n. 41-51.
113. Olásolo, supra note 7, Ch 2.vii.
114. Martic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 80, citing the Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 13), at paras 194-220.
115. Lubanga Case (Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision on Prosecution's Application for Warrant of Arrest) ICC-01/04-01/06 (10 Feb 2006) para 78;
116. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 320; and
117. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of the Charges (supra note 6), at paras 466 and 467.
118. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at paras 333-341; and
119. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at para 488(a), 520 and 521.
120. See also inter alia J.M. Gómez Benítez, Elementos Comunes de los Crímenes contra la Humanidad en el Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional 42 Actualidad Penal 1121-1138 (2002);
121. K. Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999), p. 479 [hereinafter Ambos, Article 25];
122. and A. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 791.
123. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 337; and
124. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at para 483.
125. See supra Section (2).
126. Duch Case (Amicus Curiae Concerning Criminal Case File No 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)) 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)-D99-3-27 (27 Oct 08) in this volume, at para 2 [hereinafter Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief].
127. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 337; and
128. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at para 483.
129. See also Werle (supra note 33), at 212-213; and
130. Ambos, Article 25 (supra note 58), at 478-480.
131. G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 549 (2005) [hereinafter Fletcher and Ohlin].
132. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 13), at paras 227-228;
133. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at paras 79-83;
134. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at paras 83-84;
135. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 96;
136. Stakic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 64;
137. Brdanin Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 10), at para 364; and
138. Martic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24) at paras 80-84.
139. See also Duch Case (Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the Center for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill University Montreal (Quebec) Canada), 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02)-D99-3-25 (27 October 2008) in this volume, at paras 15-24 [hereinafter McGill Amicus Curiae Brief];
140. Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9), at 5.1.1;
141. Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 61), at 3.1
142. See also V. Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 International Criminal Law Review 170 (2005) [hereinafter Haan].
143. Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (supra note 24), at para 1096.
144. Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) ICTY-97-25-T (15 March 2002) at para 78.
145. See also Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 13), at paras 202, 203, 228;
146. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 89;
147. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 98;
148. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 82; and
149. Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (supra note 24), at para 80. See also Haan, supra note 64.
150. Its application has been considered particularly apposite to cases in which the common criminal plan is to forcibly remove at gun-point members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to effect 'ethnic cleansing') with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common plan, it was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint could very well result in the deaths of one or more of those civilians. See in particular Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at paras 204, 228; and
151. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 99.
152. See also Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 32;
153. Blaskic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 32), at para 66;
154. Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 83;
155. Stakic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at para 65;
156. Martic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24) at paras 83-84; and
157. Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (supra note 24), at para 81;
158. See also Haan, supra note 64, at 191-192.
159. Tadic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at paras 204, 228;
160. Vasiljevic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 99;
161. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 32;
162. Blaskic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid); Kvocka Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 83;
163. Stakic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid), at para 65;
164. Martic Case Appeals Judgment (Ibid) at paras 83-84; and
165. Krajisnik Case Trial Judgment (Ibid), at para 81.
166. See also Haan, supra note 64, at 191-192.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid.
169. Blaskic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 32), at para 33.
170. See also The Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj et al. (Judgment) ICTY-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para 139.
171. This interpretation is supported by a number of authors, such as S. Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 609 (2004);
172. van der Wilt, supra note 32, at 96; and
173. Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 61), at 18.
174. According to ICC PTC I, the cumulative reference to 'intent' and 'knowledge' in article 30 of the ICC Statute requires the existence of a volitional element on the part of the suspect. This would inter alia include 'situations in which the suspect (a) is aware of the risk that the objective elements of the crime may result from his actions or omissions, and (b) accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting to it (also know as dolus eventualis).' Moreover, according to ICC PTC I, in situations of dolus eventualis one can distinguish two types of scenarios: 'First, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is substantial (that is, there is a risk of the substantial likelihood that "it will occur in the ordinary course of events") the fact that the suspect accepts the idea of bringing about the objective elements of the crime can be inferred from: (i) the awareness by the suspect of the substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omissions would result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime; and
175. the decision by the suspect to carry out his or her actions or omissions despite such awareness. Secondly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low, the suspect must have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may results from his or her actions or omissions.'
176. See Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at paras 350-353.
177. See also the concurring definition of dolus eventualis provided for in the Stakic Case Trial Judgment (supra note 14), at para 587.
178. ICC PTCI has also underscored in the Lubanga case that dolus eventualis and advertent recklessness are different notions insofar as (advertent) recklessness 'is not part of the concept of intention.'
179. See Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 355, n 438.
180. See also G. P. Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law (2nd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 443.
181. Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9), at paras 26-27.
182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. The standard proposed by the Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9), at 5.1.1,
185. does not even reach the level of inadvertent recklessness, which resembles to the civil law category of 'gross negligence', insofar as it is based on a 'man of reasonable prudence' or 'average man' standard. See the distinction between inadvertent recklessness (gross negligence) and mere negligence in Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 358.
186. Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9), at para 82.
187. See inter alia Stakic Case Trial Judgment (supra note 14), at para 587;
188. The Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic (Judgment) ICTY-98-29-T (5 December 2003), paras 54-55;
189. Brdanin Case Trial Judgment (supra note 26) para 386;
190. The Prosecutor v Nasser Oric (Judgment) ICTY-03-68-T (30 June 2006) para 348; and
191. The Prosecutor v Milan Martic (Judgment) ICTY-95-11-T (12 June 2007) para 60. Moreover, in the context of command responsibility, the "should have known" standard introduced by The Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic (Judgment) ICTY-95-14-T (3 March 2000) 332 has been systematically rejected by the Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals because; according to them, articles 7(3) of the ICTY Statute and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute do not criminalise the superiors' mere lack of due diligence in complying with their duty to be informed of their subordinates' activities. See in this regard, The Prosecutor v Ignace Bagilishema (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTR-95-01A-A (3 July 2002) paras 35-42;
192. The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic et al. (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-96-21-A (20 February 2001) para 241;
193. Krnojelac Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 24), at para 151;
194. Blaskic Case Appeals Judgment (Above n 32), at para 62;
195. The Prosecutor v Stanislav Galic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-98-29-A (30 November 2006) para 184;
196. The Prosecutor v Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-01-47-A (22 April 2008) paras 26-29;
197. The Prosecutor v Nasser Oric (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-03-68-A (3 July 2008) 51;
198. The Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar (Appeals Chamber Judgment) ICTY-01-42-A (17 July 2008) para 297.
199. In the Stakic case, the Defence argued on appeal that the notion of joint criminal enterprise could not be used to 'impermissibly enlarge' the general subjective element provided for in the definition of such crimes and that would constitute a violation of the principle of legality. The Stakic Case Appeals Judgment (supra note 24), at paras 100-101, rejected the Defence claim by merely stating that, insofar as the notion of joint criminal enterprise does not violate the principle of legality because it has been found to be part of customary international law since 1992, its individual components (including the subjective element of the extended form of joint criminal enterprise) do not violate the legality principle either.
200. See the explanation of the notion of ulterior intent given by Smith & Hogan (supra note 18), at 112-113.
201. Particular attention must be paid not to confuse the common law notions of specific intent (which refers to the general subjective element and its equivalent to the civil law notion of dolus directus in the first degree) and ulterior intent (which refers to an additional subjective element consisting of a specific purpose that must motivate the commission of the crime and its equivalent to the civil law notion of dolus specialis).
202. Prosecutor v Brdanin (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal) ICTY-99-36-A (19 March 2004) paras 5-10.
203. See also Andre Rwamakuba v The Prosecutor (Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide) ICTR-98-44-AR72.4 (22 October 2004) paras 10, 14, 31 [hereinafter Rwamakuba Case Decision on the Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide].
204. Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 61), at 3.5 and 4.3.3; and
205. McGill Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 64), at paras 42 et seq.
206. See also generally the problems identified by A. Zahar and G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford, OUP, 2007), pp. 221-257; and
207. Boot, Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2002), pp. 288-304;
208. Ohlin, supra note 28, at 69 et seq; and van Sliedregt, supra note 31, at 184 et seq.
209. This has prompted some strong supporters of the notion of joint criminal enterprise to caution against its overbroad application. See A. Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 109 (2007).
210. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 326; and
211. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at para 520.
212. Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 61), at 3.5.
213. See McGill Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 64), at para 49; and
214. Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief (Ibid), at 3.5.
215. van Sliedregt, supra note 31, at 281-285. In order to justify the application of the extended form of joint criminal enterprise to genocide, van Sliedregt has affirmed that it is a theory of accessorial liability to which the principles of derivative liability apply. She reaches her conclusion in light of the following two premises: (i) the notion of joint criminal enterprise as elaborated by the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals is rooted in the common purpose doctrine applied in common law jurisdictions and in post WW II cases; and
216. common law jurisdictions and post WW II cases have never regarded the common purpose doctrine as a theory of co-perpetration giving rise to principal liability; quite the contrary, they considered it as a theory of partnership in crime of accomplice liability. See van Sliedregt (supra note 31) 201 to 205.
217. See also McGill Amicus Curiae Brief (Ibid), at paras 50-51; and
218. Ambos Amicus Curiae Brief (Ibid), at 3.5.
219. Cassese Amicus Curiae Brief (supra note 9), at 5.3.2.
220. Concurring, Fletcher and Ohlin, supra note 63, at 549.
221. Ibid.
222. Lubanga Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 16), at para 337; and
223. Katanga and Ngudjolo Case Confirmation of Charges (supra note 6), at para 483.
224. See also Werle, supra note 33, at 212-213; and Ambos, Article 25, supra note 58, at 478-480.