When do legislators pass on pork? the role of political parties in determining legislator effort

American Political Science Review

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 99-112

  Keefer, Philip ^a   Khemani, Stuti ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651108835     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055409090054     Document Type: Article

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