Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 464-484

  Khemani, Stuti ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Delegation; Intergovernmental transfers; Political economy

Indexed keywords

FISCAL POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

ASIA; EURASIA; INDIA; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 33751198742     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.04.001     Document Type: Article

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