Dealing with weak instruments: An application to the protection for sale model

Political Analysis

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 236-260

  Gawande, Kishore ^a   Li, Hui ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651102497     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpp009     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2008. Income and democracy. American Economic Review 98:808-42.
2. Anderson, T. W., N. Kunitomo, and T. Sawa. 1982. Evaluation of the distribution function of the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. Econometrica 50:1009-27.
3. Anderson, T. W., and H. Rubin. 1949. Estimators of the parameters of a single equation in a complete set of stochastic equations. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 21:570-82.
4. Anderson, T.W., and T. Sawa. 1979. Evaluation of the distribution function of the two-stage least squares estimate. Econometrica 47:163-82.
5. Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger. 1991. Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:979-1014.
6. Baldwin, Robert. 1985. The political economy of US import policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7. Bartels, Larry M. 1991. Instrumental and 'quasi-instrumental' variables. American Journal of Political Science 35:777-800.
8. Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. Short versus long coalitions: Electoral accountability and the size of the public sector. American Journal of Political Science 50:251-65.
9. Beaulieu, Eugene, and Chris Magee. 2004. Campaign contributions and trade policy: New tests of Stolper-Samuelson. Economics and Politics 16:163-87.
10. Bombardini, Matilde. 2008. Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation. Journal of International Economics 75:329-48.
11. Bound, J., D. A. Jaeger, and R. Baker. 1995. Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variables is weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90:443-50.
12. Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria V. Murillo. 2004. Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. American Journal of Political Science 48:742-57.
13. de Melo, Jaime, and David Tarr. 1990. Welfare costs of U.S. quotas in textiles, steel and autos. Review of Economics and Statistics 489-97.
14. Eicher, Theo, and Thomas Osang. 2002. Protection for sale: An empirical investigation: Comment. American Economic Review 92:1702-10.
15. Facchini, Giovanni, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, and Gerald Willmann. 2003. Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing. University of Kiel Economics Working Paper.
16. Feenstra, Robert, and Lee Branstetter. 2002. Trade and foreign direct investment in China: A political economy approach. Journal of International Economics 58:335-58.
17. Fuller, Wayne A. 1986. Measurement error models. New York: John Wiley.
18. Gabel, Matthew, and Kenneth Scheve. 2007. Estimating the effect of elite communications on public opinion using instrumental variables. American Journal of Political Science 51:1013-28.
19. Gallaway, Michael P., Christine A. McDaniel, and Sandra A. Rivera. 2003. Short-run and long-run industry-level estimates of U.S. Armington elasticities. North American Journal of Economics and Finance 14: 49-68.
20. Gao, Chuanming, and Kajal Lahiri. 2000. Further consequences of viewing LIML as an iterated Aitken estimator. Journal of Econometrics 98:187-202.
21. Gawandem, Kishore, and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. Lobbying and agricultural policy in the United States. International Organization 2006:527-61.
22. Gawande, Kishore, and Pravin Krishna. 2003. The political economy of trade policy: Empirical approaches. In Handbook of international trade, eds. J. Harrigan and E. Kwan Choi. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
23. Gawande, Kishore, and Usree Bandyopadhyay. 2000. Is protection for sale? A test of the Grossman-Helpman theory of endogenous protection. Review of Economics and Statistics 89:139-52.
24. Greene, William H. 2000. Econometric analysis. 4th ed. New York: Prentice Hall.
25. Goldberg, Pinelopi, and Giovanni Maggi. 1999. Protection for sale: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review 89:1135-55.
26. Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 4: 833-50.
27. Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. Electoral competition and special interest politics. Review of Economic Studies 63:265-86.
28. Hahn, Jinyong, and Jerry Hausman. 2002a. A new specification test for the validity of instrumental variables. Econometrica 70:163-89.
29. Hahn, Jinyong, and Jerry Hausman. 2002b. Notes on bias in estimators for simultaneous equation models. Economics Letters 75:237-41.
30. Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, coalitions, and factor mobility: Evidence from congressional votes on trade legislation. American Political Science Review 96:593-608.
31. Hufbauer, Gary C., Diane T. Berliner, and Kimberly A. Elliott. 1986. Trade protection in the United States: 31 case studies. Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics.
32. Kelejian, Harry H. 1971. Two stage least squares and econometric systems linear in parameters but non-linear in the endogenous variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association 66:373-4.
33. Kleibergen, Frank. 2002. Pivotal statistics for testing structural parameters in instrumental variables regressions. Econometrica 70:1781-804.
34. Konisky, David M. 2007. Regulatory competition and environmental enforcement: Is there a race to the bottom? American Journal of Political Science 51:853-72.
35. Lassen, David D. 2005. The effect of information on voter turnout: Evidence from a natural experiment. American Journal of Political Science 49:103-18.
36. Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. 2007. Strategic party government: Party influence in congress, 1789-2000. American Journal of Political Science 51:464-81.
37. Lewbel, Arthur. 1997. Constructing instruments for regressions with measurement error when no additional data are available, with an application to patents and R&D. Econometrica 65:1201-14.
38. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Richard Nadeau, and Angelo Elias. 2008. Economics, party, and the vote: Causality issues and panel data. American Journal of Political Science 52:84-95.
39. McCalman, Phillip. 2004. Protection for sale and trade liberalization: An empirical investigation. Review of International Economics 12:81-94.
40. McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. Party discipline as a determinant of the endogenous formation of tariffs. American Journal of Political Science 41:584-607.
41. Mitra, Devashish. 1999. Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long-run model of trade policy determination. American Economic Review 89:1116-34.
42. Mitra, Devashish, Dimitrios D. Thomakos, and Mehmet A. Ulubasoglu. 2002. Protection for sale' in a developing country: Democracy versus dictatorship. Review of Economics and Statistics 84:497-508.
43. Moreira, Marcelo J. 2003. A conditional likelihood ratio test for structural models. Econometrica 71:1027-48.
44. Nelson, Charles R., and Richard Startz. 1990. Some further results on the exact small sample properties of the instrumental variables estimator. Econometrica 58:967-76.
45. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
46. Phillips, Peter C. B. 1983. Exact small sample theory in the simultaneous equations model. In Handbook of econometrics. Vol. 1, eds. Z. Griliches and M. D. Intrilligator, 449-516. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland.
47. Prakash, Aseem, and Matthew Potoski. 2006. Racing to the bottom? Trade, environmental governance, and ISO 14001. American Journal of Political Science 50:350-64.
48. Reinhardt, Eric, and Marc Busch. 1999. Industrial location and protection: The political and economic geography of U.S. nontariff barriers. American Journal of Political Science 43:1028-50.
49. Rothenberg, T. 1975. Bayesian analysis of simultaneous equations models. In Studies in Bayesian econometrics and statistics, eds. S. E. Fienberg and A. Zellner. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland.
50. Rudra, Nita. 2005. Globalization and the strengthening of democracy in the developing world. American Journal of Political Science 49:704-30.
51. Smith, R. J., and R. W. Blundell. 1986. An exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation Tobit model with an application to labor supply. Econometrica 54:679-86.
52. Staiger, Douglas, and James H. Stock. 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica 65:557-86.
53. Stock, James H., J. H. Wright, and Motohiro Yogo. 2002. A survey of weak instruments and weak identification in generalized method of moments. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20:518-29.
54. Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo. 2004. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In Identification and inference in econometric models: Essays in honor of Thomas J. Rothenberg, eds. D.W. K. Andrews and J. H. Stock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.