Simulating institutional controls on consumption patterns in the commons

Systems Research and Behavioral Science

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 469-486

  Huerta, Timothy R ^a,b  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agent based simulation; Complex adaptive systems; Complexity; Institutions; Sustainability

Indexed keywords

AGENT BASED SIMULATION; COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS; COMPLEXITY; CONSUMPTION PATTERNS; INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL; INSTITUTIONAL FORCES; LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY; TRADITIONAL MARKETS;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

EID: 67650601026     PISSN: 10927026     EISSN: 10991743     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/sres.922     Document Type: Article

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