The conservative insurgency and presidential power: A developmental perspective on the unitary executive

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 122, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 2071-2103

  Skowronek, Stephen ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 67650553140     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (195)

1. JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 23 (Lawbook Exch. 1998) (1820).
2. Id. Earlier, in 1815, Hugh Henry Brackenridge similarly observed that "[a] constitution is like a nose of wax; it is twisted by the party that is predominant."
3. HUGH HENRY BRACKEN-RIDGE, MODERN CHIVALRY 639 (Claude M. Newlin ed., Am. Book Co. 1937) (1815),
4. reprinted in THOMAS GUSTAFASON, REPRESENTATIVE WORDS 54 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See, e.g., JAMES W. CEASER, P RESIDENTIAL SELECTION 51-75 (1979);
6. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 27-45 (1987);
7. cf. James W. Ceaser et al., The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, in RETHINKING THE PRESIDENCY 233 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1982) (discussing a doctrinal shift in the twentieth century away from the original constitutional ideal and the "increasing pressure" on modern Presidents "to demonstrate their leadership capacity through an ever growing number of rhetorical performances,"
8. id. at 236).
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 306 James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("[I]t is against the enterprising ambition of [the legislative] department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions."). Hamilton defended the separation of powers as essential to control an overweaning legislature. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71
10. (Alexander Hamilton), supra, at 432 ("The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in some preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people . . . seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves . . . .");
11. see also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 140-53 (1994) (discussing the Framers' assumptions).
12. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
13. On enduring tensions in relations between Presidents and movements, see Sidney M. Milkis, The President in the Vanguard: Lyndon Johnson and the Civil Rights Insurgency, in FORMATIVE ACTS: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE MAKING 269 (Stephen Skowronek & Matthew Glassman eds., 2007)
14. [hereinafter FORMATIVE ACTS];
15. Elizabeth Sanders, Presidents and Social Movements: A Logic and Preliminary Results, in FORMATIVE ACTS,
16. supra, at 223;
17. and Daniel J. Tichenor, Leaders, Citizenship Movements, and the Politics Rivalries Make, in FORMATIVE ACTS, supra, at 241.
18. On Andrew Johnson's efforts to contain and stigmatize the ambitions of congressional Republicans for a more radical reconstruction of the South in the mid-1860s, see, for example, Nicole Mellow & Jeffrey K. Tulis, Andrew Johnson and the Politics of Failure, in FORMATIVE ACTS, supra note 6, at 153.
19. On Bill Clinton's efforts to contain and stigmatize the ambitions of congressional Republicans working on behalf of the conservative agenda of the mid- 1990s, see, for example, ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GINGRICH CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE (1996).
20. See JOHN P. MACKENZIE, ABSOLUTE POWER: HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY IS UNDERMINING THE CONSTITUTION 1-4,31-62 (2008);
21. JAMES P. PFIFFNER, POWER PLAY: THE BUSH PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION (2008);
22. Steven E. Schier, George W. Bush and Washington Governance: Effective Use of a Self-Limiting Style, 6 FORUM, Issue 2, art. 2, 2008, available at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol6/iss2/art2/.
23. See, e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 8, at 5-11;
24. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004);
25. A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994);
26. A. Michael Froomkin, Still Naked After All These Words, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1420 (1994);
27. Greene, supra note 4;
28. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. I (1994);
29. Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006);
30. Louis Fisher, Jack Rakove, John Yoo, & Gordon Silverstein, Discussion at the University of California, Berkeley: The Imperial Presidency and the Founding (Sept. 19, 2008) (video available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= w1qGDeAZ9-w).
31. On the progressives' critique of constitutional rigidities and the rejection of "Constitution worship," see, for example, HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 200 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (1909);
32. and WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 215 (Peter Smith ed., World Publ'g Co. 1973) (15th prtg. 1901).
33. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 309-51 (1965).
34. On this oft-noted reversal, see, for example, James Risen, The Executive Power Awaiting the Next President, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4;
35. and Sam Tanenhaus, Sidebar: When Reining in an Imperial President Was the Conservatives' Cause, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4.
36. See JAMES BURNHAM, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1959);
37. ALFRED DE GRAZIA, REPUBLIC IN CRISIS: CONGRESS AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE FORCE (1965);
38. Willmoore Kendall, The Two Majorities, 4 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 317 (1960);
39. G. Patrick Lynch, Protecting Individual Rights Through a Federal System: James Buchanan's View of Federalism, 34 PUBLIUS, Fall 2004, at 153.
40. See, e.g., Peri E. Arnold & L. John Roos, Toward a Theory of Congressional-Executive Relations, 36 REV. POL. 410 (1974).
41. See JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1941).
42. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479 (1994) (indicating how a unitary theorist might accommodate the improvisational developments that have come to surround presidential power over time).
43. For a description of the range of views, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 18-21 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 45-70 (1995);
45. Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses As Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377, 1395-1400 (1994);
46. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994);
47. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992);
48. see also JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTI-TUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)
49. [hereinafter YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE];
50. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006).
51. See YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 18.
52. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308, 318, 328-29 (2006);
53. Steven G. Calabresi & Daniel Lev, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 4 FORUM, Issue 2, art. 8, 2006, available at http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol4/iss2/art8/.
54. See generally MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949).
55. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793),
56. reprinted in 1 CLASSICS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 634, 636 (Scott J. Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick & Howard L. Lubert eds., 2007).
57. William H. Harbaugh, The Constitution of the Theodore Roosevelt Presidency and the Progressive Era, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 63, 67 (Martin L. Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991);
58. see also id. at 66-68.
59. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 380 (Da Capo Press 1985) (1913);
60. accord id. at 371-72, 379-80.
61. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY xi, 14-18 (2007);
62. Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 411-12 (1986).
63. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 17, at 245.
64. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997);
65. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 667 (2003);
66. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 45-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005);
67. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1880-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2004).
68. See, e.g., HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JEFFERSON AND MADISON 78 (Prentice Hall 1963) (1891).
69. See JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER 18 (2007).
70. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 5-6, 9, 22 (2005);
71. SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776-2002, at 103 (2003).
72. For a discussion of the nominating caucus, see M. Ostrogorski, The Rise and Fall of the Nominating Caucus, Legislative and Congressional, 5 AM. HIST. REV. 253, 263-64 (1899). Ostrogorski may exaggerate the efficiency of this system, but he nicely captures contemporary understandings of its departure from original constitutional assumptions.
73. See also C.S. THOMPSON, AN ESSAY ON THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS AS A MACHINE FOR NOMINATING CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENCY (1902);
74. William G. Morgan, The Decline of the Congressional Nominating Caucus, 24 TENN. HLST. Q. 245 (1965).
75. See WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 67-80 (1962);
76. CEASER, supra note 3, at 101-06, 118-19;
77. RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE P RESIDENTIAL GAME 76-163 (1982).
78. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 130-54 (1997).
79. See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 176-78 (1967).
80. See MCCORMICK, supra note 32, at 164-206;
81. MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 30, at 130;
82. Martin Shefter, Party, Bureaucracy, and Political Change in the United States, in POLITICAL PARTI ES 211, 218-25 (Louis Maisel & Joseph Cooper eds., 1978).
83. See Gerald Leonard, Party As a "Political Safeguard of Federalism": Martin Van Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 244-76 (2001).
84. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1829-1861, at 558 (1954).
85. Senator A.H. Bailey, Speech at the Republic Party Convention Held at Rome, New York (Sept. 26, 1862), in Proceedings of the Republican Party Convention Held at Rome, New York, UTICA MORNING HERALD, Sept. 27, 1862, at 5
86. [hereinafter Proceedings of the Republican Party Convention], available at http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c= nys;idno=nys592.
87. Proceedings of the Republican Party Convention, supra note 38, at 11.
88. With the eclipse of the Federalist party as a serious competitor in presidential elections, the caucus nomination became, de facto, a selection of the next President. See sources cited supra note 31.
89. See, e.g., MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS, 1865-1896, at 3-315 (1938);
90. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 170-86 (1942).
91. See, E.G., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982);
92. Fred I. Greenstein, Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 45, 45-86 (Anthony King ed., 1978).
93. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (forthcoming Aug./Sept. 2009) (manuscript at ch. 5, on file with the Harvard Law School Library);
94. Sidney M. Milkis & Daniel J. Tichenor, "Direct Democracy" and Social Justice: The Progressive Party Campaign of 1912, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 282, 289-98 (1994).
95. The term "enlightened administration" comes from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 751-52 (Samuel 1. Rosenman ed., 1938).
96. See also Sidney M. Milkis, The Rhetorical and Administrative Presidencies, 19 CRITICAL REV. 379, 386 (2007).
97. See ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 8-47 (1994);
98. MARC STEARS, PROGRESSIVES, PLURALISTS, AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE STATE: IDEOLOGIES OF REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN, 1909-1926, at 52-87 (2002).
99. See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES 98-124 (1993);
100. SKOW-RONEK, supra note 42, at 52-55.
101. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913);
102. J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Cushing Strout ed., 1965);
103. WILSON, supra note 10.
104. CROLY, supra note 10, at 35-38. Even Charles Beard speaks of the Framers as "practical men" who were "able to build . . . government upon the only foundations which could be stable: fundamental economic interests."
105. BEARD, supra note 47, at 151.
106. And again in The Supreme Court and the Constitution, Beard writes that the "makers" of the Constitution were conservatives "made desperate by imbecilities of the Confederation and harried by state legislatures" who "drew themselves together in a mighty effort to establish a government that would be strong enough to pay the national debt, regulate interstate and foreign commerce, provide for national defence, prevent fluctuations in the currency. . ., and control the propensities of legislative majorities to attack private rights."
107. CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 75-76 (1912).
108. CROLY, supra note 10, at 169.
109. HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 145-48 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1914);
110. see also EISENACH, supra note 45, at 73, 216 n.56 (quoting Croly).
111. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS 58 (3d ed. 1970).
112. See BEARD, supra note 47.
113. See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997).
114. See generally JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR-P ARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA (1963);
115. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960).
116. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (1908) ("If [the President] rightly interprets] the national thought and boldly insist[s] upon it, he is irresistible . . . .");
117. id. at 70-71 ("[I]f Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the makers of the Constitution, -it will be from no lack of constitutional powers on its part, but only because the President has the nation behind him, and Congress has not. He has no means of compelling Congress except through public opinion.").
118. HENRY JONES FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS 292-93 (1898).
119. CHARLES A. BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 100 (5th ed. 1930) (1910).
120. CROLY, supra note 10, at 136.
121. Id. at 168.
122. See Ceaser et al., supra note 3, at 243-46.
123. See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT (1985).
124. See CROLY, supra note 10, at 35 ("[E]very popular government should in the end, and after a necessarily prolonged deliberation, possess the power of taking any action, which, in the opinion of a decisive majority of the people, is demanded by the public welfare.").
125. The progressives' faith in a discernable "public" interest is indicated in a negative way by Walter Lippmann's announcement of his turn away from progressivism in WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925).
126. STEARS, supra note 45, at 56-87.
127. CROLY, supra note 10, at 213-14.
128. See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
129. Woodrow Wilson, Address in Chicago on Abraham Lincoln: A Man of the People (Feb. 12, 1909), in 19 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 33, 42 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1975).
130. EDITH GITTINGS REÍD, WOODROW WILSON: THE CARICATURE, THE MYTH AND THE MAN 236 (1934) (internal quotation mark omitted).
131. The notion of "parastate" institutions comes from Eldon Eisenach. See EISENACH, supra note 45, at 18 ("Both organizationally and culturally, the institutions that consciously articulated and enforced claims of a national public good were established largely outside of formal governing institutions and in direct opposition to the most powerful informal governing institution of them all - the mass-based political party. Put in a slightly different way, many of these nongovernmental organizations, like the political parties they were beginning to supplant, took on the characteristics of 'parastate' institutions; that is, they claimed to speak for and establish on a voluntary basis what they claimed to be the collective ends of the national community.");
132. see also Donald T. Critchlow, Think Tanks, Antistatism, and Democracy: The Nonpartisan Ideal and Policy Research in the United States, 1913-1987, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 279 (Michael J. Lacey & Mary O. Fumer eds., 1993;
133. Michael J. Lacey, The World of the Bureaus: Government and the Positivist Project in the Late Nineteenth Century, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 127.
134. See generally THE STATE AND SOCIAL INVESTIGATION IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, supra.
135. The classic expression of the progressive ideals of administrative expertise and independence is JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
136. The ideal in practice is described in SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (195g);
137. and RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND FARM POLITICS IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1966).
138. For examples of the entrepreneurial capacities of progressive administrators to combine these new resources and fashion independent centers of authority and power, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001);
139. and Daniel P. Carpenter & Colin D. Moore, Robust Action and the Strategic Use of Ambiguity in a Bureaucratic Cohort: FDA Officers and the Evolution of New Drug Regulations, 1950-70, in FORMATIVE ACTS, supra note 6, at 340, 345-55.
140. MERRIAM, supra note 51, at 246.
141. Id. at 254.
142. Id. at 258.
143. Id. at 262.
144. See, for example, the retrospective assessment of original purpose in Don K. Price & Rocco C. Siciliano, Revitalizing the Executive Office of the President, in RETHINKING THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 3, at 305, 305-07,
145. as well as the argument that the EOP should be structured to encourage internal cooperation in Hugh Heclo, OMB and Neutral Competence, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 131 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 2d ed. 1999). Writing of the Employment Act of 1946, which set up a Council of Economic Advisors in the Executive Office and a Joint Economic Committee in Congress, J. Bradford De Long notes: "Their goal was to reduce the freedom of action of the president and his staff by fixing responsibility for stabilization policy planning on identifiable individuals chosen with the consent of the Senate."
146. J. Bradford De Long, Keynesianism, Pennsylvania Avenue Style: Some Economic Consequences of the Employment Act of 1946, J. ECON. PERSP, Summer 1996, at 50.
147. See JOHN HART, THE P RESIDENTIAL BRANCH 52-53, 68-69 (2d ed. 1995);
148. STEPHEN HESS, ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY 53-55 (1976) (asserting that the NSC and CEA were designed to structure and discipline the flow of information to the President and "force feed" professional advice).
149. NEUSTADT, supra note 54, at 33.
150. See generally id.
151. See generally THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969);
152. MILKIS, supra note 46;
153. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
154. LOWI, supra note 61;
155. see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., JOURNALS, 1952-2000, at 260 (2007) (describing the moment of disillusionment with presidency-centered government for one of the twentieth century's foremost progressives).
156. See generally LOUIS FISHER, P RESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004);
157. MILKIS, supra note 46;
158. TULIS, supra note 3.
159. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 18, at 5.
160. ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 211-85 (2005).
161. In a Similar spirit, see DAVID K. NICHOLS, THE MYTH OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY (1994).
162. See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989);
163. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 9-97 (1994);
164. NICHOLS, supra note 83, at 139-61;
165. see also Benjamin A. Kleinerman, Can the Prince Really Be Tamed? Executive Prerogative, Popular Apathy, and the Constitutional Frame in Locke's Second Treatise, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 209 (2007);
166. Sheldon S. Wolin, Executive Liberation, 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 211, 211-16 (1992)
167. (reviewing MANSFIELD, supra).
168. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 17, at 30-36;
169. see also YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 18, at 30-142 (discussing these early developments with respect to the President's foreign affairs power).
170. See Hadley Arkes, On the Moral Standing of the President As an Interpreter of the Constitution: Some Reflections on Our Current "Crises," 20 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 637 (1987).
171. 10 REG. DEB. 84-85 (1833) (statement of Sen. Henry Clay);
172. Richard J. Ellis & Stephen Kirk, Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century: Conceptual Change and Institutional Development, g STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 117, 152-53 (1995).
173. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS (1916).
174. Id. at 140.
175. Interview by Martha Raddatz with Richard Cheney, Vice President of the United States, in Muscat, Oman (Mar. 19, 2008) (transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/politics/story?id=4481568).
176. Instructive on this point is Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
177. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 201-03 (2002) (describing the Reagan Administration's strategic thinking about signing statements).
178. See LOWI, supra note 78.
179. See, e.g., HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS 78-80 (1977).
180. See generally RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983);
181. RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED (1975).
182. Note the Nixon-era breakpoints in the organization history as reviewed by HART, supra note 75, at 1-147;
183. see also HECLO, supra note 94, at 13, 75;
184. and KAREN M. HULT & CHARLES E. WALCOTT, EMPOWERING THE WHITE HOUSE 166-72 (2004).
185. CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE & RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1984) (quoting Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon (May 19, 1977)).
186. See generally JAMES MANN, THE RISE OF THE VULCANS (2004) (exploring the formative years of some Bush Administration officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations).
187. See Minority Report, in REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, S. REP. NO. 100-216 (1987).
188. See TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE STRONG PRESIDENCY (1992);
189. see also THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (responding to the frustrations of the late years of the Reagan Administration).
190. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT (2008).
191. See Jeremy D. Bailey, The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453 (2008).
192. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Denniston and James Cheetham (June 6, 1801), in 34 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 264-65 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2007).
193. Louis Fisher relies on a different reading of the revolutionary sequence to reach very different conclusions. See FLSHER, supra note 80;
194. see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb (pts. 1 & 2), 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 941 (2008).
195. For an interesting response to this conundrum, see Greene, supra note 4, at 153-96.