Toward A Theory of Congressional-Executive Relations

The Review of Politics

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 1974, Pages 410-429

  Arnold, Peri E ^a   Roos, L John ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 84959640030     PISSN: 00346705     EISSN: 17486858     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0034670500034008     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. President Abraham Lincoln, “Message to Special Session of Congress,” July 4, 1861.
2. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973), pp. 64–67, 105–109. Schlesinger stresses informal comity and political understanding as linking the President and Congress at these moments of expansive claims of Presidential power.
3. The major political biographies of Roosevelt are: Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 4 vols. (Boston, 1952–1973); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 3 vols. (Boston, 1957); James M. Burns, Roosevelt, 2 vols. (New York, 1956 & 1971).
4. Wilfred Binkley, The President and Congress (New York, 1947).
5. Walter Johnson, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue (Boston, 1960).
6. Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (2nd ed. New York, 1960).
7. Ibid., p. 237., Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (2nd ed. New York, 1960)
8. Ibid., pp. 250–251., Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (2nd ed. New York, 1960)
9. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York, 1964).
10. James M. Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.j., 1963).
11. Neustadt’s little book is troublesome and, perhaps, deceptive. We want to tread a fine line between oversimplification and all the rich implications we see in Neustadt’s analysis. We admit that there are statements here which can be drawn out of the whole context and used to support the alternate theory of the Presidency and Congress we offer below. But we attempt to deal with this book as a whole conception and reconstruct the argument which characterizes the whole work.
12. Neustadt, p. 43.
13. Ibid., p. 174. 15 Burns, p. 338., Neustadt
14. Ibid., p. 260., Neustadt
15. Ibid., p. 325., Neustadt
16. Joseph Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch (New York, 1964).
17. Richard Boiling, House Out of Order (New York, 1965).
18. Roger Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O’Leary, “Theories of Congress,” in Ronald C. Moe (ed.), Congress and the President (Pacific Palisades, California, 1971), p. 139.
19. Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation (Chicago, 1959). Also see Kendall, “The Two Majorities,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 4 (November, 1960), pp. 317–345.
20. Ernest Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role (New York, 1951).
21. James Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition (Chicago, 1959).
22. Alfred de Grazia, Republic in Crisis (New York, 1965).
23. Hamilton, Jay and Madison, The Federalist (New York, n.d.), p. 337.
24. Ibid., p. 445, Hamilton, Jay and Madison, The Federalist (New York, n.d.)
25. James Madison, Debates of the Federal Convention, in Max Farrand (ed.), Records of the Federal Convention, vol. I (rev. ed., New Haven, 1937), pp. 282–293.
26. Federalist, p. 424.
27. Ibid., p. 423., Federalist
28. Ibid., p. 429., Federalist
29. Alfred de Grazia, p. 75.
30. On the politics and practice of PPB see: Allan Schick, “The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform,” Public Administration Retnew, XXVI (Dec, 1966), pp. 243–258; Leonard Merewitz and Stephen Sosnick, The Budget’s New Clothes (Chicago, 1971); Aaron Wildavsky, “The Political Economy of Efficiency,” Public Administration Review, XXVI (Dec, 1966), pp. 292–310.
31. On the Army Corps of Engineers, see Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters (Cambridge, 1951). On the Farm Security Administration, see Grant Mc-Connell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley, 1953).
32. On the “captive” President and Vietnam, see: David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn., 1972). A consistent, but different, analysis is offered by Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, 1972), pp. 101–135.
33. On executive reorganization, see: Harold Seidman, Politics, Position and Power (New York, 1970); Peri E. Arnold, “Reorganization and Politics,” Public Administration Review, 34 #3 (May/June, 1974), pp. 205–211.
34. Randall Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York, 1969).
35. Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics, XVI (July, 1964), 677–715.
36. In his contribution to this issue, “In the Wake of Watergate: Congressional Reform?”
37. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, vol. II, The Age of Roosevelt (Boston, 1957), pp. 150, 398–406.
38. Ibid., chapter 3 and John L. Shover, “Populism in the Nineteen-Thirties: The Battle for AAA,” Agricultural History, XXXIX (January, 1965), pp. 17–24.
39. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston, 1885).
40. Wilfred Binkley, p. 178,
41. Stephen Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York, 1964), p. 234.
42. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1950–1969. Figures for Truman before 1950 were not compiled by CQ. After 1969, rules for recording votes in the House were changed, making totals noncomparable. For 1963 the whole year was attributed to Kennedy.
43. This data is drawn from an examination of the Congressional Record. It is presented in L. John Roos’ unpublished master’s thesis, University of Chicago, 1969, and Stephen Witham’s ongoing master’s research at the University of Notre Dame. Our gratitude to Mr. Witham. The bills in 1961–62 were all those receiving a roll call in both houses. In 1947,, 1953, 1959, 1962 and 1966, bills were selected at random by Mr. Witham. The other bills come from Roos’ thesis.